1943 Dnepr airborne operation: lessons and conclusions

Military Thought, July, 2003 by Nikolai Viktorovich Staskov

On the whole the plan was a rather detailed affair, embracing almost everything that had a relation to the preparation and execution of the airdrop operation and subsequent combat actions. But it also had substantial flaws, failing to take into account the real situation that had taken shape on the Voronezh front. Specifically, the front aviation was unable to cope with its airdrop support missions, because it did not have time enough to redeploy to new airfields and lacked sufficient fuel and ammunition. In addition, the plan did not indicate the procedure for cooperation between the airborne force and troops on the ground; moreover, for secrecy considerations the forward units were to be informed about the airdrop only after the force took defensive positions in the enemy rear.

Many points in the plan were out of touch with the real situation and sooner good wishes than strict obligations. For example, it was decided to mark out the objective area by setting fire to four villages at its corners. But the plan failed to specify who was to perform the task. Like in the Vyazma operation, it was envisaged that each plane would perform two to three flights per night. As is evident from experience, the type of organization of preparations for and execution of an airborne operation, where planning the use of a large airborne force was mostly left to the paratroops themselves, failed to work very well. But the impact of these faults on the operation might have been minimized had there been some thorough reconnaissance effort and analysis of possible changes in the operational situation. Yet no one had done anything specifically for the purpose. The AT command showed passivity, leaving this crucial issue to the Front's staff.

The final phase of preparations for the airdrop was all haste. In the morning of September 23, Army General N.F. Vatutin came to the command post of the 40th Army to be told that no major enemy forces had been spotted in the Bukrin bend area. In the meantime, the German command had divined the main axis of the impending Soviet push and taken countermeasures by rushing three divisions to the same area. Another two infantry divisions moved in later after crossing the Dnepr. The front reconnaissance had failed to notice this dramatic change in the situation in time.

While at the command post of the 40th Army (commander Gen. K.S. Moskalenko) the Front commander specified, through AT commander Maj. Gen. A.G. Kapitokhin, the combat tasks to be performed by the airborne force. The aim of the operation remained the same: it was supposed to interdict the arrival of enemy reserves at the Bukrin beachhead. For this purpose, the Front commander ordered to land two airborne brigades: 3rd abn brig (Col. P.A. Goncharov) had the assignment to land south-east of Rzhishchev, to capture the position between Lipovyi Rog, Makedony and Kozarovka and to hold it pending the arrival of 40th Army units; 5th abn brig (Lt. Col. P.M. Sidorchuk) was ordered to land west of Kanev so as to capture the position between Gorkavshchina, Stepantsy and Kostyanets and to hold it in cooperation with 3rd abn brig. 1st abn brig, which had failed to concentrate in full in the forming-up area, was left in reserve and ready to be dropped on a second or third night.