Using the "ORM box." - explaining the concept of operational risk management to aircraft maintainers

Combat Edge, March, 2002 by Steven J. Morani

Recently, my wing received a Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) from our Numbered Air Force (NAF) Safety office. Part of the SAV involved the NAF Chief of Safety interviewing a randomly selected group of commanders and asking them about their safety program. My maintenance squadron had just completed our annual ground and weapons safety inspection with flying colors so my chest was inflated and my voice was deeper as I prepared to talk about our success. Although the safety chief was interested in our success, this wasn't quite what he was looking for. After a few minutes of reading between the lines of his questions, I realized that he wanted to know how I was implementing Operational Risk Management (ORM) in my squadron. Fortunately, I was just as prepared to answer that question. I hope my response helps others with their ORM programs.

When I arrive at an organization, one of my first priorities is to define my goals and expectations so I avoid the guessing game that sometimes takes place when a new commander or supervisor takes charge. This eliminates about 6 months worth of mystery. Like every commander before me, I had drafted my commander's safety letter that conveyed my safety policy to all my airmen. Despite how great it looked on paper, I began to wonder how many of my airmen below flight chief were really reading and heeding what I said.

I began attending the monthly newcomers' briefing. About two-thirds of the troops present are airmen on their first enlistment. Half of them are brand new troops fresh from technical training or have just completed orientation at the base's first term airmen center. Their heads are spinning with too much information, and they already have forgotten why some of it was important. I had to find a way to make ORM more than just another acronym they had to remember so I drew them a picture of my "ORM box." This box is how I define the risk limits I'm willing to let my maintainers take. It is framed on each side by the following decision tools they use every day.

SIDE ONE AIR FORCE INSTRUCTIONS

The first side of my box is framed by Air Force Instructions (AFIs). These instructions provide guidance for how we manage our particular squadron, flight, section, or maintenance operation. For the combat aircraft maintainer, the overarching instructions are AFI 21-101, Maintenance Management of Aircraft, and Air Combat Command Instruction 21101, Objective Wing Aircraft Maintenance.

These two instructions, along with a host of others, provide a framework for the maintenance mission to produce sorties both during peacetime and in combat conditions. Imagine going from base to base without a common set of rules and procedures. My cranium hurts just thinking about it. Each time a troop was to PCS, they would have to relearn and redefine the way they were expected to do business. They would have to figure out by trial and error which methods are the most efficient and the safest to meet mission requirements. This is way too risky.

AFIs standardize organizational structure and procedures to enable routine decision-making that uses proven methods. In the case of AFIs, we have learned that less isn't always better. The more definitive the guidance provided, the less likely of venturing off in a direction that will lead to failure.

SIDE TWO SAFETY STANDARDS

The second side of the box is framed by Safety Standards. These include AFOSH standards, safety operating instructions, and occupational health standards that minimize exposure to risk. By adhering to proven safety practices and protective measures, risk of personal injury can be minimized. This side of the box is there for personal protection. When a troop chooses to step over this side of the box, personal injury usually follows.

Every Monday morning, my squadron safety NCO hands me a folder that contains mishap reports from the previous week or weekend. In almost every case, they are preventable. In my squadron, back injuries seem to top the list. During my squadron immersion, I went out to Ammo and built up some BDU-33 practice bombs with a crew. Once assembled, we had to stack them in a container that was about 3-feet deep. As I leaned over the container to lay the first row of bombs into the container, I felt my back talking to me. Because I had learned this lesson before, I went to the support section and cinched on a back support. In this case, common sense kicked in. Often with ORM, if it doesn't look or "feel" right, it probably isn't.

SIDE THREE TECHNICAL GUIDANCE

The third side of the box is framed by Technical Guidance. The Air Force spends a lot of money on Technical Orders (T.O.s) to ensure our maintainers perform each task correctly. In my mind, there is never a good reason to not use a T.O. Many of the warnings and cautions in the T.O.s are written in blood as a result of technicians getting injured by taking unnecessary risks. I guarantee no responsible leader expects a maintainer to perform the numerous complex tasks each day by memory.