What do we mean by "transformation"? An exchange - defense policy, United States

Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2002 by Andrew L. Ross, Michele A. Flournoy, Cindy Williams, David Mosher

We must also acknowledge the specter of interservice rivalry, a Pandora's box that senior leaders are so afraid to open that they do not create fora where ideas and concepts of operations can really compete. Relatedly, even a very promising concept developed and experimented with by a particular service may be viewed with suspicion by the others if it is brought into the joint arena--as if the service in question were bent on using the innovation to increase its own budget share and decrease others'.

Finally, as I have hinted, we face the reality of near-term demands. Any new strategy, even one that would genuinely increase the emphasis on transformation, must deal with the demands of the real world, the here and now. Transformation often gets crowded out by more immediate concerns. Those concerns include the effects, which are still with us, of the procurement holiday of the 1990s. A number of recapitalization needs are in direct competition with transformation priorities.

The Long Poles in the Tent, and Recommendations

Let me turn now to the two most important areas upon which we should focus. The first is development of new concepts of operations for priority mission areas. Concept development has not been given high enough priority; too few "racehorses" are dedicated to the task. The services typically give the task either to contractors or to small "futures groups," not core elements of their own staffs. In the joint realm as well, there are too few avenues for vetting and testing new concepts. Joint Forces Command is a tremendous addition, but it cannot do it all, certainly not at its current size and level of staffing.

Within the headquarters, there has been a general lack of incentives to break with current doctrine or current approaches; there is a general sense that if you are too innovative, you may dash your promotion opportunities. Now, contrast that with how the Germans, before World War II, came up with the concept that eventually yielded the blitzkrieg. The German army told a group of lieutenant colonels and colonels that, in effect, they could not be promoted unless they came up with something that broke current doctrine.

What I am really arguing for is a fundamental change in culture from one of consensus--which would pursue a transformation that causes no one to be uncomfortable--to a productive and open forum where ideas and concepts for solving priority mission problems or tasks can truly compete.

The other "long pole in the tent" is organizational change--the transformation, or more broadly the rationalization, of the Department of Defense itself. If transformation focuses only on the fighting "tooth" and ignores the supporting "tail," it will ultimately fail. We have to reduce unnecessary duplication between the services in key support areas like logistics, C4ISR (*), possibly even some aspects of training. We need acquisition reform. We have to eliminate unneeded infrastructure, to outsource and commercialize functions like accounting, health care, long-haul communications, and so on. If the Defense Department does not transform the way it does business, it will not have the resources to transform the U.S. military. Nor would it be able to support effectively a transformed force. There are huge political and bureaucratic barriers to surmount here, but this issue has to be put on the table if transformation is going to succeed.