The joint forces air command problem: is network-centric warfare the answer?

Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2003 by Major William A. Woodcock

The American military's biggest problem? It lets technology drive strategy, rather than letting strategy determine technology.

BRIG. GEN. DON MORELLI, USA (RET.)

The marriage of network-centric warfare and the joint forces air component commander concept represents a "military-technical revolution" in aerospace command and control. (1) The current system is cumbersome, and it is falling behind in its ability to deal with the fast-paced warfare of today. By its nature, network-centric warfare (NCW) could address many of the shortfalls of the current joint air component system. It will not, however, change the fundamental nature of war, nor can it solve all of the current problems of the joint forces air component commander (JFACC). This article will examine the potential and limitations of network-centric warfare in terms of command and control and in the context of the JFACC.

Network-centric warfare--the "effective linking or networking of knowledgeable entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed"--promises to raise command and control to new levels of efficiency. (2) Conceptually, NCW provides battlespace entities with "shared battlespace awareness" through interconnectivity and networking techniques. (3) These techniques in turn allow the movement of information and decisions at rates and efficiencies previously unattainable. These "virtual organizations" can use "common operational pictures" to "self-synchronize," potentially reducing the fog and friction of war as well as shortening decision and execution times. (4) The ability to relay a common picture of the war and share information with geographically dispersed sensors, decision makers, and weapon platforms would reduce the time it takes them collectively to observe the situation, orient themselves to the problem, decide what to do, and act. (5) Such faster decision making would increase the flexibility, l ethality, and speed of airpower.

Nonetheless, and for all that network-centric warfare promises to bring to the joint forces air component commander, there are problems that it cannot fix. Conflicts in or problems with doctrine, inadequate or convoluted command and control structures and procedures, and poor decision making will remain. In any case, it cannot change the nature of warfare. "War is an act of human intercourse"; (6) the technology of NCW can go only so far to correct uniquely human problems. Additionally, limitations are likely to arise in relation to the specifics of required command and control systems, connectivity, or the validity of the JFACC concept itself. These matters are necessarily beyond the scope of this article, which assesses the likelihood that network-centric warfare can dramatically increase the efficiency and flexibility with which air warfare is conducted.

In its current form, the joint forces air component commander is the central element of the concept that (in the view of the U.S. Air Force) combines centralized command and control of air assets with decentralized execution of air warfare. (7) Under joint doctrine, the joint air commander, whose function is to control air and space power in a given area of operations, is appointed by and works directly for the joint forces commander. (8) The JFACC concept also incorporates key tenets of specifically Air Force airpower doctrine: "Air and Space power must be controlled by an airman who maintains a broad strategic and/or theater perspective in prioritizing the use of limited air and space assets to attain the objectives of all U.S. forces in any contingency across the range of operations." (9) History is full of examples of the perils of dividing up airpower assets and of the advantages of centrally controlling them. (10) The Air Force believes that parceling airpower out to various agencies and among various t asks will negate its inherent qualities of mass, flexibility, and transcendent scope--that is, its freedom from limitation by geography, water depth, road conditions, etc. The service's doctrine declares that the joint forces air component commander should be "an airman who maintains a broad and/or theater perspective," for reasons of perspective that would become particularly relevant with the advent of network-centric warfare.

THE ISSUES

As a preliminary to evaluating NCW's potential contribution, it is important to understand the problems and issues of the current organization and tasks of joint forces air component command. Most prominent are a myriad of difficulties arising from centralization: most of the functions for which the joint air commander is responsible--planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, and executing air operations in accordance with the joint forces commander's objectives--are conducted in a single air operations center. (11) The first of this category of issues is that the concentration of tasks makes the air operations center (or AOC) a critical--and vulnerable--node in the command and control of a major element of U.S. military forces. Its destruction would virtually cripple air operations. All of the air operations center's functions are singular; there are no backups for them. The system has no "redundancy" in this respect; it cannot deal with a loss of the AOC.