The joint forces air command problem: is network-centric warfare the answer?

Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2003 by Major William A. Woodcock

Finally, the development of network-centric systems needs to focus on making the control of airpower more efficient. The air tasking order process needs to be replaced. The moving surface target problem needs to be solved. In general, joint forces air component commanders and their operations centers need to operate with greater speed and efficiency. Properly developed, network-centric warfare will allow all these things to happen.

The application of network-centric principles to the joint forces air component commander concept would represent a large leap ahead in the command and control of air assets. Many of the shortcomings of the present system could be resolved using NCW principles and technology; others could not be. However, the truly important goal is to prevent technology from driving theory. Technology represents capabilities, present and future. It is not enough to say, "What can technology do?" We must ask, "What do we need it to do?" Network-centric warfare is a tool; if it is to be useful, it must have a defined purpose. There must exist well-thought-out doctrine to guide its development. We have discussed here possible first principles by which to shape the evolution, and initiate the integration, of network-centric warfare and the joint forces air component commander.

NOTES

(1.) Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment," July 1992; excerpted in Air Command and Staff College Distance Learning (ver. 2.2) CD-ROM (Maxwell Air Force Base [hereafter AFB]:ACSC/DLO, 1999). "A military-technical revolution occurs when the application of new technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation to alter fundamentally the character and conduct of military operations. Therefore, such revolutions are characterized by technological change, military systems evolution, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation. These elements combine to produce a dramatic improvement in military effectiveness and combat potential."

(2.) David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare, 2d rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CCRP, 1999), p. 6.

(3.) "Battle space" is defined by the Joint Staff as "the environment, factors, and conditions which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest." Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Related Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: 23 March 1994, as amended through 14 June 2000), p. 74. The entities referred to in this article are the sensors, decision makers, and actors involved in the conflict. It is the integration and interaction of these three entities that define "OODA loops" of combat force employment. NCW defines these functions in terms of grids: "The information grid enables the operational architectures of sensor grids and engagement grids"; Arthur K. Cebrowski [Vice Adm., USN] and John I. Garstka, "Network-centric Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998, p. 33. (The concept of the "OODA [Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act] loop" is attributed to the late Colonel John Boyd, USAF, who framed it to argue an enemy can be defeated by achieving a faster decision cycle.) For battlespace awareness, see Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, p. 115.