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The joint forces air command problem: is network-centric warfare the answer?
Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2003 by Major William A. Woodcock
(4.) The "common operational picture" that emerges from the fusion of all available information on the battle space provides a unified, functional, and cohesive representation of events to all entities involved in operations. For self-synchronization, Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, p. 175.
(5.) Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 16 July 1997), p. 221.
(6.) Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 149.
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(7.) This is an Air Force view of the JFACC. Other services do not agree. Joint doctrine calls only for the centralized planning of airpower, to ensure unity of effort, followed by decentralized execution; see Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command control for Joint Air Operations, Joint Publication 3-56.1 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 14 November 1994), p. 1-2. According to joint doctrine, authority is delegated to the JFACC by the regional commander or joint task force commander, in accordance with mission requirements. The Air Force view is pertinent here in that it is the basis for JFACC operations under way today. Every JFACC since the Persian Gulf War has been an Air Force officer.
(8.) Joint Publication 3-56.1, p. I-2.
(9.) Secretary of the Air Force, Basic Air Force Doctrine, AFDD 1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:, September 1997), p. 23.
(10.) Phillip S. Meilinger, "Ten Propositions Regarding Airpower," Airpower Journal, Spring 1996, pp. 66-7.
(11.) Joint Publication 3-56.1, p. II-3.
(12.) U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report (Washington, D.C.: 31 January 2000), p.45.
(13.) Joint Publication 3-56.1, p. II-8.
(14.) U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report to Congress, p. 130.
(15.) Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1992), p. 103.
(16.) James A. Winnfield and Dana J. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity of Command and Control, 1942-1991 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 110.
(17.) Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), p.457.
(18.) Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, p. 38.
(19.) William C. Martel, ed., The Technological Arsenal: Emerging Defense Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). For reachback, see Scott M. Britten, "Directing War from Home: Reachback Operations."
(20.) While the Navy has conducted exercises, such as Joint Task Force Exercise 99-1, to explore the viability of an afloat JFACC, until all required functions are networked sea-based JFACC operations will be limited. In the meantime, NCW promises to ease many of the current limitations.
(21.) CHECKMATE is the Air Force's premier air planning staff; it is currently located in the Air Staff at the Pentagon. It was the CHECKMATE staff, under Colonel John Warden, that laid the foundations for the air operations of DESERT STORM.
(22.) Robert D. Chelberg, "EUCOM: At the Center of the Vortex," Field Artillery, October 1993, p. 14.
