The joint forces air command problem: is network-centric warfare the answer?

Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2003 by Major William A. Woodcock

Finally, no two scenarios are the same, a reality that places a premium on the flexibility of an air operations center. Not all components of the notional AOC structure are needed in all situations. Network-centric warfare would allow the joint forces air component commander to tailor a virtual organization to the task at hand. By virtue of such NCW fundamentals as reachback and networking, only organizations necessary for a given mission need be "brought to the fight." This point is particularly relevant for such major headquarters as regional commands; indeed, the current crisis management philosophy of European Command is to build joint task forces from the ground up, tailoring them to meet particular crises. (22) This approach represents a marked departure from the traditional concept of standing task forces and air operations centers; (23) network-centric warfare should give regional and joint task force commanders the ability to form trained air component command structures on short notice.

Network-centric warfare will mitigate a subtle danger inherent in reliance upon a centralized decision-making entity--the equating of the concepts of "command" and "control." They have been inexorably linked for years, but they are very different notions. Command has been defined as "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission." (24) "Control," joint doctrine declares, "is inherent in command." (25) Even so, "control" embraces the "procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission." (26) In short, command is authority, and control is a process. Ultimately, command authority over a joint force's air and space assets rests with its air component commander; network-centricity will significantly enhance the JFACC's ability to exercise it. Improved connectivity with subordinates will enhance the joint air commander's ability to "d irect people and organizations into actions to accomplish missions." (27)

Networking will also allow joint forces air component commanders to delegate control more effectively. The primary rationale in the past for centralized command and control was that generally only the commander had "the whole picture." (28) NCW makes it possible to extend, to levels not previously feasible, "distributive control"--delegation of responsibilities and processes to levels or organizations best suited to them--and thereby achieve not only lessened vulnerability but faster decision cycles and operational tempos. In a network-centric force, vital information is distributed to all appropriate levels of control, depending on the mission; experts in particular disciplines--given the knowledge and authority required to assess, decide, act, and control--can achieve smaller and more efficient response cycles than were ever before possible.

Properly trained subordinates, with clear and firm guidance from the joint forces air component commander, will be informed and connected decision makers. In a network-centric system, however, the onus is on commanders to ensure that a correct understanding of their overall intentions and the objectives of particular operations pervades the control structure. "Mission-type orders"--telling subordinates what needs to be done, not how--issued through a network in conjunction with air tasking orders will provide control elements the guidance they need. (29) Properly designed and reinforced by education, training, and doctrine, centralized command and decentralized control would allow the joint forces air component commander to employ aerospace power with maximal effectiveness.