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The joint forces air command problem: is network-centric warfare the answer?
Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2003 by Major William A. Woodcock
Further, a well-fused picture would bring improvements to another area we have mentioned as a weakness: the detection, identification, and prosecution of time-sensitive surface targets. (37) The necessary advances--more responsive tasking of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; rapid sharing and analysis of the raw information; and transmission of high-fidelity, "targetable" data to a weapon platform in time to use it--will be hallmarks of network-centric warfare.
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The prosecution of moving surface targets and theater missile defense (TMD) have many information needs in common, including timely detection, accurate analysis and identification, and immediate communication with weapons systems capable of engaging targets. In a networked environment, there is no necessity, as now, to compete for this information (which might be closely held by agencies for classification or bureaucratic reasons); it can be shared between and collaborated on by people not necessarily at the same location. Such collaboration in real time constitutes "self-synchronization' a prerequisite for the quick and efficient prosecution of such difficult but important targets. (38) Agencies and commands specializing in moving ground targets and TMD, respectively, can collaborate not only in analysis but in selecting the best means to strike the target. A weapon platform normally assigned to one of these functional areas can be used to attack a target of the other. With the proper delegation of control, both surface and theater-missile targets could be disposed of with rapidity not possible today.
WHAT NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE CANNOT DO
For all of the capabilities that NCW could bring to joint forces air component commanders and their air operations centers, there are several things that cannot be expected from it. Above all, NCW cannot replace people. Warfare is a uniquely human endeavor. Technology can allow war to be waged more efficiently but cannot change its nature. In the very nature of things, human judgment will always be required in the planning and execution of operations in wartime: "Human flexibility and common sense transcend the realm of logic." (39) Such intangibles as personal experience, intuition, insight, and charisma will always be prerequisites of effective leadership. Network-centric warfare can certainly aid in the decision-making process, but it cannot replace the decision maker. Let us take a historical, and dramatic, example.
Shortly after the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) came on line, it detected what appeared to be a launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles from the Soviet Union. A committee instantly convened to determine whether an attack was actually in progress. One of its members recalled that the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was in New York at the time. It seemed highly unlikely the Soviets would launch an attack with their leader so exposed; the committee accordingly decided that what looked like a Soviet missile launch was not. It was later determined that the powerful BMEWS radars had been receiving returns from the moon. This possibility had not been anticipated, and the BMEWS software had erroneously interpreted the indications as a missile launch. (40) Not every contingency can be imagined when systems are being developed; human decision makers must be the final authority.
