The casualty-aversion myth

Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2004 by Richard A. Lacquement, Jr.

   It's easy to see.... [P]eople go off to war and the bands play and
   the flags fly. And it's not quite so easy when the flag is draped
   over a coffin coming back through Dover, Delaware.

   SENATOR JOHN GLENN, 1997

What is the nature of the American public's sensitivity to U.S. military casualties? How does casualty sensitivity affect the pursuit of American national security objectives? (1) The first question is easy to answer: There is no intrinsic, uncritical casualty aversion among the American public that limits the use of U.S. armed forces. There is a wide range of policy objectives on behalf of which the public is prepared to accept American casualties as a cost of success. Squeamishness about even a few casualties for all but the most important national causes is a myth. Nonetheless, it is a myth that persists as widely accepted conventional wisdom.

The second question is more difficult to answer. Avoidance of casualties is an unassailably desirable objective. It is precisely the natural nobility of the argument that makes it susceptible to misuse in the policy-making process, potentially leading to ineffective or inefficient choices. The persistence of the myth also causes adversaries to misjudge the likely reactions of the United States. In both of these ways, the myth of deep-seated casualty aversion among the American public hinders the pursuit of American national objectives.

The evidence indicates that the public response to casualties is a function of leadership and consensus among national policy elites, who have wide latitude in this area. They should not allow concern about casualties to replace thorough consideration of the larger context of costs and benefits. National leaders must not let unsubstantiated assertions of American casualty aversion distort the national security policy-making process or compromise professional military ethics.

This article briefly describes the nature of American casualty sensitivity, identifies some prominent negative effects of widespread acceptance of the casualty myth, and offers recommendations that may produce a more accurate understanding of the American public's casualty sensitivity.

AMERICAN CASUALTY SENSITIVITY

Are the American people in fact reluctant to risk lives? In a superficial and unhelpful sense, the American public is always reluctant to risk lives, particularly if there is some other reasonable way to accomplish objectives. No one wants casualties.

Myth and Conventional Wisdom

   We had 500 casualties a week when we [the Nixon administration]
   came into office. America now is not willing to take any casualties.
   Vietnam produced a whole new attitude.

   HENRY KISSINGER, 1999

   It's obvious that there's a political agenda to have low
   casualties.... If my Achilles' heel is the low tolerance of the
   American people for casualties, then I have to recognize my success
   or failure in this mission [in Bosnia] is directly affected by that.

   MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM L. NASH, 1996

   [America is] a nation intolerant of casualties.

   EDWARD LUTTWAK, 1995

   And the hearts that beat so loudly and enthusiastically to do
   something, to intervene in areas where there is not an immediate
   threat to our vital interests, when those hearts that had beaten so
   loudly see the coffins, then they switch, and they say: "What are we
   doing there?"

   SENATOR WILLIAM COHEN (LATER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

These are just some of the many similar expressions of the conventional wisdom of American public casualty aversion. (2) The conventional wisdom is strong among civilian, military, and media elites. Steven Kull and I. M. Destler have recorded many interviews--with members of Congress and their staffs, the media, the executive branch, and leaders of nongovernmental organizations--that support this view. (3) Other interviews with members of the media and military leaders also confirm a widespread belief that the American public is unwilling to accept casualties. (4)

The wellspring of this conventional wisdom is generally understood to be the Vietnam War, as reinforced by experiences in Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993). The tremendous efforts by civilian and military leaders to minimize casualties in other operations--the Persian Gulf War (1991), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999)--can be read as a reaction to the public's purported low tolerance for casualties. Rising casualties in Iraq following the end of "major combat operations" have also been portrayed as an important factor affecting the public's willingness to support the mission. The abandonment of military intervention in several instances in which it was seriously considered has also been attributed to casualty aversion. Examples include the Balkans (before 1995), Rwanda (1994), and Zaire/Congo (1995).

Manifestations of this conventional wisdom are many and widespread--the "Vietnam syndrome," the "Dover test," the "CNN effect," part of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine, the concept of "post-heroic warfare," and a social equity effect attributed to the absence of American civilian elites and their children from military service.