Corbett in orbit: a maritime model for strategic space theory

Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2004 by John J. Klein

Despite its growing importance, no comprehensive theory of space power has been formulated.

COLIN GRAY

Since the 1950s, there have been discussions concerning the need to develop a space power theory. (1) In their attempts to formulate such a theory, strategists have noted the similarities of space operations to those of air and naval operations. Consequently, many have attempted to derive a clearly articulated, all-encompassing space theory through analogy and comparison to either airpower or sea-control models. These efforts, however, as observers like the contemporary historian and strategist Colin Gray have noted, have not produced a theory addressing space operations and associated national interest. (2) Without such a strategic framework for space, some analysts fear that national resources and military force will be applied poorly or even counterproductively.

This article, accordingly, addresses the need to codify a space theory. Do space operations and national interests in space have in fact useful parallels in either air or naval operations? If air and naval models do not fully match the essence of space operations, is there one that does? Given a suitable historical model, what are the principles for a space strategy? Would the resulting space strategic model be borne out by contemporary observations?

We will argue that neither the air nor naval model embraces the breadth of space operations and strategy. However, by expanding naval theory to include broadly maritime concerns, which incorporate the interaction of land and sea, the scope of space operations can be adequately modeled. In fact, maritime theory already exists, in the work of Sir Julian Corbett, on the basis of which maritime strategy can be defined and then the principles of space theory developed. The resulting maritime-based space theory largely meets the test of current observations and ideas while highlighting significant areas that contemporary space literature has omitted.

The United States has developed space systems and doctrine quite well without the benefit of space theory; why bother deriving one? The reason is the adage, "You don't know what you don't know." A theory attempts to make sense of what would otherwise be inscrutable, to set forth "rules of the game" by which actions become intelligible. (3) According to the Prussian military strategist and theorist Carl yon Clausewitz, theory "gives the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leaves it free to rise into the higher realms of action." (4)

To achieve in connection with space the kind of insight of which Clausewitz wrote, this article will compare past strategic theories and use the most suitable model as a framework for a strategic space theory. Using historical theories as a guide increases the likelihood of developing a meaningful space theory beyond that which arbitrary choice, pure chance, or blind intuition would allow. (5)

CURRENT OPERATIONS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

The United States has become increasingly reliant upon space. Space-based technology enters homes, businesses, schools, hospitals, and government offices through applications related to transportation, health, the environment, telecommunications, education, commerce, agriculture, energy, and military operations. (6)

Although the range is indeed broad, the nation's space activities can be divided into four major sectors--civil, commercial, intelligence, and military. (7) Civil space activities are those aimed at exploring space and advancing human understanding; the missions performed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration fall into this category. Commercial activities are performed by private companies and industry for profit. The intelligence sector involves surveillance and reconnaissance missions conducted by such government agencies as the National Reconnaissance Office. Lastly, military activities are those promoting national security through offensive or defensive operations in and through space. Space-based systems may, consistently with international law, perform essential functions facilitating military activities on land, in the air, and on and under the sea. (8) Because of the diverse and pervasive nature of the space activities of the United States, its space operations have implications spanning all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, economic, technological, or information. (9)

NAVAL AND AIR MODELS

As Colin Gray has observed, space operations have more in common with the sea and the air than is widely appreciated. (10) For just as space operations utilize ground facilities, up-and-down links to vehicles in orbit, and the satellites themselves, so naval and air operations have bases at home and facilities abroad, as well as ships and planes. Like international airspace and waters, space is open to all nations; it is free from claims of sovereignty and national appropriation. (11) Because of these similarities, Gray declares, "the history of sea power and air power offers true precedents for developing a space strategy." (12) For that reason, many elements of current space power theory have been derived from various tenets of airpower and sea control theories. (13)