China's future nuclear submarine force: insights from Chinese writings

Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2007 by Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein

It is with the Russian nuclear submarine force, however, that the Chinese navy feels the greatest affinity. This is not surprising and springs from historical, strategic, and perhaps even organizational-cultural affinities that appear to have been cemented since the passing of Sino-Soviet enmity in the late 1980s. Chinese analysts are well aware of the crisis that the Russian nuclear submarine force has suffered in recent years. They have written extensively on the Kursk tragedy and other accidents. (34) For instance, one source has documented the great embarrassment suffered during an SLBM test failure that was witnessed directly by Russian president Vladimir Putin in early 2004. (35) Chinese analysts note the vastly decreased building rate for Soviet nuclear submarines and voice concern lest the legacy force be insufficient to contend with [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] the United States. (36)

Nevertheless, respect for Russian nuclear submarine achievements has not diminished significantly. (37) A review of Soviet naval development that appeared in [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (China Military Science) in 1999 extolled the virtues of nuclear submarines: "Relying on nuclear submarines, the Soviet Union rapidly overcame the unfavorable geostrategic situation, giving the USSR an ocean going navy with offensive capability." (38) Perhaps reflecting on internal debates in China regarding naval modernization, the author also described how the Russian naval development encountered a major obstacle from a faction adhering to the notion that "navies have no use in the nuclear age" [[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]].

Reflecting on today's Russian navy, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (Modern Navy) lavished praise on the capabilities of a refurbished Typhoon-class SSBN, Dmitry Donskoy, that was re-launched in 2002; (39) it also hailed the 2001 launch of an Akula-class SSN, Gepard, which is described as the world's quietest nuclear submarine. The latter report also noted that Gepard has twenty-four nuclear-armed cruise missiles. (40) In a "war game" (of unknown origin) modeling a Russian-Japanese naval conflict, which was reported on in considerable detail in the October and November 2002 issues of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (Naval and Merchant Ships), the Russian nuclear submarine force overcame Japan's ASW forces and inflicted grave losses (thirteen ships sunk) on the Japanese navy. (41) This would appear to be a subtle argument that China also requires a substantial fleet of SSNs.

In Chinese naval periodicals, the affinity with the Russian nuclear submarine force is manifested by vast coverage of the minutest details of historical and contemporary platforms. In 2004-2005, for example, the journal [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (Naval and Merchant Ships) carried ten-to-fifteen-page special features, each devoted to outlining the development of a single class, such as the Victor, Delta, Oscar, or Alpha, complete with photo essays and detailed line drawings. (42) These features are suggestive of the volumes of data that have been made available over the last decade from the Russian side and, simultaneously, the voracious appetite for such information within China's naval studies community. Among such descriptions, perhaps no Russian submarine commands as much respect and interest as the massive Typhoon. Chinese analysts are captivated not only by this vessel's gargantuan proportions but also by the efficiency of its reactors, its impressive quieting characteristics, the attention to crew living standards, and its command and control equipment and procedures. (43) Evidently Chinese naval analysts appear to comprehend the strategic significance of a platform that could strike adversary targets from the "Russian-dominated Barents and Okhotsk seas." (44)