Mines and underwater IEDS in U.S. ports and waterways: context, threats, challenges, and solutions

Naval War College Review, Wntr, 2008 by Scott C. Truver

The U.S. Coast Guard's sector commanders, in their roles as "Captains of the Port" (COTPs) and local Federal Maritime Security Coordinators, will be crucial to mine/UWIED defense. Among other vital security and safety functions, COTPs:

* Establish the port maritime security plans for their respective areas of responsibility

* Conduct risk-based area security assessments

* Develop area maritime transportation plans

* Have command-control-communications responsibilities and authorities for MHLS incidents

* Can close ports in the event of emergency

* Provide a vital "bridging function" among the Defense and Navy departments and regional, state, local, and commercial partners, as a result of the Coast Guard's inherent military, civilian, maritime, law enforcement, and humanitarian character and authorities.

But a Captain of the Port has no capability--or even desire--actually to conduct MCM operations. Vice Admiral lames D. Hull, USCG (Retired), who served as Atlantic Area Commander, understood well the need to deal with mines and UWIEDs in American waters, "but that's primarily the Navy's responsibility," as he later explained. (21) "The Navy has the expertise and equipment to do the job. The real question is whether the Navy's MCM forces can respond in the appropriate time to neutralize a no-notice threat." Of interest in this regard is the fact that the Coast Guard's 2007 Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship in only two places mentions "water-borne IEDs," and even there it limits the concept to a small-boat/bomb threat like the one that attacked the USS Cole and nowhere mentions mines or underwater IEDs. (22) Likewise, the Coast Guard's Underwater Terrorism Protection Plan of mid-2007 does not address mine/UWIED threats or defense requirements.

Since 2003, the Navy and Coast Guard have, however, come together at the "grassroots" levels to address the mine and UWIED threat. The three LEAD SHIELD exercises on the West Coast have uncovered surprising capabilities and strengths but also many more areas that need close attention, especially command-and-control relationships involving nonmilitary participants. (23) Other war games conducted by the Office of Naval Research and by the mine warfare program at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School during 2006-2007 have identified technological, system, and platform issues that also need focused attention and sustained funding. (24)

More, a 2005 memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for the inclusion of the Coast Guard in support of Maritime Homeland Defense (MHLD) established for MHLD operations a Defense Department joint command and control structure that includes Coast Guard forces and identified that service's MHLD roles, missions, and functions. (25) It recognizes that the Coast Guard "is at all times a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States," is charged with maintaining a state of readiness "to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war," and is "authorized to work closely and cooperatively with the Navy during peacetime." The memorandum of agreement also underscores the Coast Guard's role "in support of the National Security Strategy while maintaining its identity as an armed force." Recognizing also that maritime homeland defense missions "required flexibility, time-critical response, and immediate access to a broad spectrum of capabilities and associated forces to ensure mission success," it "establishes a standing DoD [Department of Defense]/DHS working relationship and operational C2 [command and control] construct for conducting MHLD missions under the authority and command of DoD."