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Thinking About Innovation
Naval War College Review, Spring, 2001 by Williamson Murray
(4.) For the role of the United States in World War II, see Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2000).
(5.) See in particular Williamson Murray, "The Emerging Strategic Environment: An Historian's Thoughts," Strategic Review, Winter 1999.
(6.) See Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare," in Murray and Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, chap. 1.
(7.) Ibid., chaps. 2 and 10.
(8.) See in particular Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles, American and British Aircraft Carrier Development (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000).
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(9.) For how well the American military is addressing the emerging threats, see Williamson Murray, "Preparing to Lose the Next War?" Strategic Review, Spring 1998.
(10.) For the impact this is already having on the American military, see Williamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computer In, Military Culture and Technological Hubris," National Interest, Summer 1997.
(11.) As early as spring 1996 this author heard a senior Army general suggest to a war college class that "the digitization of the Army spells the end of Clausewitz."
(12.) For the deleterious effects of long interwar periods, see Andrew Gordon and John Woodward, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: James Murray, 1996).
(13.) See Murray and Millett, A War to Be Won, chap. 10.
(14.) See Williamson Murray, The War in the Air, 1914-1945 (London: Cassell, 1999), chap. 1.
(15.) In 1924 the RAF's air staff produced a memorandum arguing that forces attacking an enemy nation "can either bomb military objectives in populated areas from the beginning of the war, with the objective of obtaining a decision by moral effect which such attacks will produce, and by the dislocation of the country, or, alternatively, they can be used in the first instance to attack enemy aerodromes with the view to gaining some measure of air superiority, and when this has been gained, can be changed over to the direct attack on the nation. The latter alternative is the method which the lessons of military history seem to recommend, but the Air Staff are convinced that the former is the correct one." Public Records Office, AIR 20/40, Air Staff Memorandum 11A, March 1924.
(16.) For Luftwaffe preparations see Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation, 1985), chap. 1.
(17.) For the Butt Report see Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, vol. 4, Appendices (London: H.M. Stationery Off., 1962), app. 13, p. 205.
(18.) Quoted in James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992), p. 37.
(19.) Ibid.
(20.) Quoted in Harold R. Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938 (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1988), p. 127.
(21.) The appalling defeat in the Gazalla battles in May-June 1942 against Rommel underlined these defects clearly.
