"A matter of extreme urgency": Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902 - United States-Germany conflict over alleged German expansionistic efforts in Latin America

Naval War College Review, Spring, 2002 by Edmund Morris

He could not have known that even then, strategists on the Wilhelm-strasse--which is to say, in Germany's foreign ministry--were working in the deepest secrecy on a plan for the possible invasion of the United States. This plan called for Tirpitz to dispatch his fleet to the Azores at the first signal of transatlantic hostilities. From there, the fleet would steam south, take Puerto Rico, and then launch surprise attacks along the American seaboard. German troops advancing on New York City would march within a few miles of the Roosevelt house in Oyster Bay, Long Island.

Lacking such detailed intelligence, the president had to rely on his intuition as the Venezuelan crisis developed. Fortunately, in matters concerning the Monroe Doctrine that intuition was acute indeed. He sensed the distant circling of a predator. He gave notice in his annual message to Congress that the United States was looking to its defenses. For the first time in the nation's history, TR announced, "naval maneuvers on a large scale are being held under the immediate command of the Admiral of the Navy [George Dewey]." Coincidentally or not, those maneuvers were to be conducted in the same theater as the Anglo-German blockade. On 21 November 1902, four battleships of the North Atlantic Squadron arrived off the Puerto Rican island of Culebra. The four cruisers and two gunboats of the Caribbean Squadron awaited them there. At other points in the

Western Hemisphere, more white warships put to sea, converging like slow bullets upon the target area.

Seapower, an obsession of Roosevelt's youth, had returned to haunt him as commander in chief. Since entering the White House he had been "straining every nerve to keep on with the up building of our Navy." (7) Perhaps his most important achievement in that regard had been the appointment of ardent strategic reformers as secretary of the Navy and chief of the Bureau of Navigation. William H. Moody and Admiral Taylor were working to create a larger, more war-ready fleet, and they did not lack for funds. Roosevelt's first message to Congress had generated enough money to finance the construction of two battleships and two armored cruisers, and there had been a special appropriation for the Caribbean maneuvers. The president had, at the urging of a messianic young lieutenant named William S. Sims, instigated a fleetwide program to improve gunnery. With less fanfare, he had also organized a six-month survey of the Venezuelan coastline and had transferred control of Culebra to the Navy Department, in case of sudden war."

In 1902, tables of naval strength worldwide ranked the United States behind Britain, France, and Russia in tonnage of ships built and building, but ahead of Germany at 507,000 to 458,000 tons. This position would soon improve, since the United States had, thanks to Theodore Roosevelt, more tonnage under construction than any other country except Britain. However, Germany had more warships in commission, especially in the Atlantic, at twelve battleships to eight. American ships were more heavily armed, with standard twelve-inch and thirteen-inch guns; but in November 1902 Germany enjoyed an advantage in aggregate fighting mass of about 50 percent.