A tale of two fleets: a Russian perspective on the 1973 Naval standoff in the Mediterranean

Naval War College Review, Spring, 2004 by Lyle J. Goldstein, Yuri M. Zhukov

Slightly more than three decades have passed since the United States and the Soviet Union confronted the most severe maritime crisis of the Cold War. Occuring when the strategic focus of the U.S. Navy had been on the Vietnam War for several years, this standoff witnessed the effective exploitation of American political, strategic, and tactical vulnerabilities by an adversary that ten years prior had had virtually no Mediterranean naval presence whatsoever. Indeed, this substantial maritime challenge had emerged from a continental power that had traditionally focused its naval strategy exclusively on coastal defense.

In an age when the many battles of the global war on terror could distract the U.S. Navy from its core mission of sea control, this often forgotten episode of superpower brinksmanship is a timely reminder that naval threats can emerge rapidly. The Mediterranean crisis demonstrates that America's opponents could achieve local sea-denial capabilities in the face of severe constraints, even in a theater of traditional U.S. naval dominance.

In examining Soviet maritime strategy in the Mediterranean before and during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, this study draws on new evidence from Russia made available through cooperation with the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg, interviews with ex-Soviet naval ofricers, and newly available Russian memoirs and military journals. These new sources--many of which have never before been exploited by Western analysts-include an unpublished personal journal of Captain First Rank Yevgenii V. Semenov, one-time chief of staff of the Soviet Fifth Eskadra (the Mediterranean squadron). It offers day-by-day accounts of ship movements and firsthand insight into Soviet strategic thinking.

This new evidence paints a picture of a Fifth Eskadra on the verge of direct intervention and much more willing to engage in hostilities than previously thought. This work stands in contrast to scholarly works on the topic that have tended to emphasize Soviet restraint and reluctance to exercise force in local conflicts. (2) In addition, this study has empirical value in that most previous unclassified sources have relied almost exclusively on an American viewpoint) Russian perspectives can help us understand the significant challenges faced by a land power in creating and employing an oceangoing fleet.

THE CARIBBEAN PARALLEL

The Mediterranean standoff naturally brings to mind its more famous predecessor, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Whereas, the earlier crisis demonstrated the importance of naval might in enabling both flexibility and political leverage, in the later episode described here the more balanced capabilities of the opposing fleets formed a major constraint on U.S. decision makers during the crisis, leading to a much more ambiguous outcome.

The U.S. maritime advantage during the Cuban missile crisis was overwhelming and incontestable. President John F. Kennedy chose the naval blockade option--as opposed to immediate ground invasion, surgical air strikes, further diplomatic pressure, or simple inaction largely because the prospect of a naval confrontation with the Soviets was the opening scenario most favorable to Washington. (4)

Post-Stalin cutbacks in naval construction had left the Soviet fleet's blue-water ambitions effectively moribund. The Caribbean represented for Soviet captains an unfamiliar area of operation at a prohibitive distance from home ports. Moscow was unable to support or even effectively resupply or reinforce its land-based forces in Cuba from the sea. (5) Soviet merchant ships heading to Havana were generally unescorted; usable naval forces in the region were virtually nonexistent. (6)

Four Soviet long-range diesel submarines (of a type known to NATO as the Foxtrot class and to the Soviet Navy as "project 641") under the command of Captain First Rank Vitalii Agafonov--each carrying twenty-two conventional torpedoes and one nuclear-tipped weapon--left the Northern Fleet on 1 October for a new base in Havana: They faced the unenviable task of penetrating a U.S. blockade conducted by (on average) forty ships, 240 aircraft, and thirty thousand personnel. (8) In addition to this overwhelming force, the Soviet submariners were tackling immense technical and mechanical difficulties. Since Soviet nuclear submarines were at that time relatively unsafe and untested, older diesel boats were sent in their place. (9) The diesel Foxtrots proved unsuitable for the operation. The boats, especially in that climate, were hot; temperatures inside reached 50[degrees]C (122[degrees]F), forcing the crew to cool off by sitting neck deep in water. The boats also lacked cooling systems for their batteries, which greatly complicated recharging. The Foxtrots furthermore had to surface often to receive instructions from Moscow and recharge batteries. (10)

The noisy engines and regular surfacing made the boats particularly vulnerable to U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces. Land-based hydroacoustic installations discovered the submarines off the Azores, and American aircraft constantly trailed the boats for the rest of the voyage. To escape their shadowers the Foxtrots were forced to dive to depths of over two hundred meters, out of communications with each other or with Moscow. (11)