A tale of two fleets: a Russian perspective on the 1973 Naval standoff in the Mediterranean

Naval War College Review, Spring, 2004 by Lyle J. Goldstein, Yuri M. Zhukov

   It seemed to me then, that the sailors understood the necessity of
   the presence of our naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea.
   "Ships of the Russian Fleet have been here, on the Mediterranean
   Sea, since the times of mommy Catherine [II, the Great]--said the
   senior torpedo crew member.--We know how sailors under the command
   of Spiridov, Ushakov, Senyavin traversed and fought here." (17)

In a similar vein, Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, the Fifth Eskadra's chief of staff from 1970 to 1973, writes of the Mediterranean squadron's development: "The Russian fleet was again affirming itself in the Mediterranean Sea, as in centuries past, making a stand for the interests of Russia." (18)

The first-ever deployment of Russian naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean took place during the 1768-74 Russo-Turkish War, when Catherine II sent an expeditionary force of the Russian fleet from the Baltic to the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean Seas to support the land campaign against Turkey. Although outnumbered almost two to one, the Russian force achieved significant successes in battles off Chios and Chesme, devastating virtually the entire Turkish fleet; fifteen battleships, six frigates, and over forty smaller vessels were sunk in a matter of hours. (19)

The Russian Navy kept a permanent Mediterranean presence for several years, maintaining a blockade of the Dardanelles and exercising total sea control in the major Aegean choke points. The 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji gave Russia considerable territorial gains, as well as protectorship over the Ottoman Empire's Greek-Orthodox subjects. It also allowed Russian ships to navigate the Black Sea and pass through the Turkish straits, although control of the straits would remain a point of contention for some time.

The Montreux Restrictions

A century and a half and six Russo-Turkish wars later, the Montreux Conference of 1936 turned control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus over to Turkey and greatly restricted the movement of warships through them. (20) Moscow was initially a supporter of the Montreux initiative--the conditions would protect the Soviet Union from superior hostile fleets and greatly strengthen the potential Soviet role in the Mediterranean, as long as Turkey remained friendly, or at least neutral. (21) However, Turkey signed a mutual assistance treaty with France and the United Kingdom in 1939; after unsuccessful post-World War II Soviet attempts to obtain greater control over the straits, the Soviet Union found that the Montreux restrictions hindered its ambitions to become a Mediterranean naval power.

The provisions of the Montreux Convention most pertinent to the Soviets were the following: light surface vessels (smaller than ten thousand tons and with guns not exceeding 203 millimeters), minor war vessels, and naval auxiliaries could pass, with few restrictions; all warship transits had to be declared to Turkish authorities eight days prior; and foreign warships could pass only in groups totaling fifteen thousand tons or less. Black Sea powers were granted special privileges not permitted to other foreign powers: capital ships (surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, exceeding tonnage limits of light surface vessels) and submarines (if en route to or from repair facilities) could be sent singly through the straits. The above conditions could be suspended, however, in the event of a war involving Turkey or if Turkey was otherwise under threat; the Turkish government was permitted complete discretion in such circumstances. (22)