A tale of two fleets: a Russian perspective on the 1973 Naval standoff in the Mediterranean

Naval War College Review, Spring, 2004 by Lyle J. Goldstein, Yuri M. Zhukov

   The initial response was first to establish a 1500 nm [nautical
   mile] ASW defence zone ... which covered the Norwegian Sea, Arctic
   and the Eastern [Mediterranean], followed, in due [course] by a
   2,500 nm zone, a radius of threat that took in Arabian Sea
   (deployments started in 1967-68) and (not coincidentally) reflected
   the range of successive Polaris systems. (30)

Moscow's singular focus on the emerging U.S. SSBN threat reflected the dominance of the Soviet ground forces in making overall strategy. It was likely these elements that initiated the deployment of often unprotected surface forces to serve as "forward observation posts," providing continuous target data on the location of U.S. and NATO nuclear strike forces. (31)

Soviet Support for Arab States

In its renewed quest for bases in the Mediterranean, Moscow turned to the Arab states. Egypt's aversion to European imperialism and to American support for Israel made it especially susceptible. After economic difficulties in the early 1960s, and especially after the devastation wrought by the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, President Gamal Abdel Nasser had become increasingly open to Soviet aid, receptive to the urgings of leftist political forces in his own country, and permissive toward Soviet use of Egyptian ports, airfields, and shore support facilities. (32) Egypt rapidly became Moscow's principal client in the Mediterranean.

In general, Soviet wartime assistance to Egypt, as well as to Syria and other Arab states, consisted of, variously: provision of military equipment and intelligence prior to hostilities; delivery of supplies during the conflict; the demonstrative use of military power in the vicinity of the war zone; transfer of military advisers and specialists to the warring countries; and finally, engagement of Soviet personnel in combat operations. Moscow's willingness to provide one or another of these kinds of support in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world had remained fairly consistent during the entire Cold War period, but it intensified in the 1970s, reflecting Moscow's more robust power-projection capabilities. (33)

Detente

In the 1970s, Moscow's commitment to its client states was supplemented by a parallel interest in U.S.-Soviet concord. The growing presence of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean lent much credence to Henry Kissinger's argument for detente--that is, since U.S. efforts to maintain regional hegemony would only provoke greater countermeasures by the Soviets, the interests of both sides would be better served by a policy of mutual restraint. (34) The new policy of detente began with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (November 1969) and was affirmed when President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R." in May 1972. This document--which outlined the principles of detente--stipulated that bilateral relations were to be based on reciprocity, restraint, economic interdependence, and conflict mitigation. Further, it asserted that efforts of one state to gain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other would be inconsistent with such objectives.