A tale of two fleets: a Russian perspective on the 1973 Naval standoff in the Mediterranean

Naval War College Review, Spring, 2004 by Lyle J. Goldstein, Yuri M. Zhukov

As mentioned above, the USSR, as a relative newcomer to the region, benefited from anti-imperialist sentiments endemic in the Arab world. (42) The Soviets were thus reluctant to undercut their propaganda by establishing permanent bases of their own in Arab lands. Instead, they relied on twelve offshore anchorages, which generally included floating dry docks and repair facilities. (43) Most of these anchorages were in international waters; the main ones were located off the Greek island of Kithira and in the Gulf of Sidra, near the north-central coast of Libya. Relatively underdeveloped underway replenishment techniques forced Soviet vessels to detach periodically from their operating stations and return to these anchorages to refuel. (44)

Despite the inherent drawbacks, however, these anchorages lent the Soviet forces a "mobile character," facilitating regular active combat training. They also simplified resupply duties, though only limited repairs were possible. (45)

Deployment Distances. The Montreux restrictions on submarine transits meant that submarines could be deployed to the region almost exclusively from the Northern and Baltic Fleets, through the Strait of Gibraltar. A former Soviet submarine officer recalls one method of passing through this NATO choke point:

   Every ship had a special method for a forced crossing underwater.
   The diving depths, speeds.... and the course were all
   predetermined.... A submarine, having come abeam the Sao Vicente
   cape, went south, confirming its location via the depth of the sea.
   Coming up to Cape Spartel (Morocco), the sub came up to periscope
   depth, and in literally one or two minutes used its radio-location
   system to determine the distance to the shore, while the navigator
   took a visual bearing through the periscope on a Spartel
   lighthouse.... After determining the location, the submarine crossed
   the strait at a high speed.... since strong currents could impede a
   slow crossing. After one of the Soviet boats hit the bottom near the
   banks of Phoenix, we were required to cross the strait with the
   fathometer on, so as to have constant control over the depth under
   the keel. We understood that this compromised stealth, although it
   was understood that in peacetime safety was more important. (46)

Sending submarines from the remote northern Soviet fleets both limited the strength of the local undersea force and slowed deployment or reinforcement in crisis situations. (47) Part of the Soviet solution was to extend the ships' stays in the region.

After 1967, access to Egyptian ports extended the time diesel submarines could remain in the Mediterranean from two months to six. (48) Facilities in Alexandria were set up to repair diesel submarines (a floating dry dock was towed to Tartus, Syria, for the same purpose). Port Said was the most heavily used of the Egyptian ports. Groups of two to three ships docked there (to curb Israeli ambitions in the Suez region) for two or three-month shifts, always in a high state of operational readiness. (49) Nonetheless, submarines were relieved much more frequently than were surface ships--if not due to the condition of the submarines then for the sake of the worn-out crews. By 1973, however, Northern Fleet SSGNs (nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarines) were being deployed to the Mediterranean for up to thirteen months at a time. The only permanent deployments in the Mediterranean were of the eskadra's commander and staff, embarked on one or another of the larger cruisers. (50)