A tale of two fleets: a Russian perspective on the 1973 Naval standoff in the Mediterranean

Naval War College Review, Spring, 2004 by Lyle J. Goldstein, Yuri M. Zhukov

Because of the operational organization of the opposing Sixth Fleet and the sheer size of the operating area, the Mediterranean Theater of Military Operations (TVD) was divided into three zones--Eastern, Central, and Western. To serve the tactical objectives of the squadron, six task forces (OSs) were created within it. OS-50 consisted of the flagship and its escort vessels; it had no fixed operating area. OS-51 comprised submarines (an average daily strength of six to eight units) pursuing U.S. SSBNs, usually in the Western and Central zones. OS-52 was made up of surface ships armed with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) tailing U.S. carriers from the points of entry to the Central and Eastern zones. OS-53 contained antisubmarine vessels, such as the Moskva, operating in the Western and Central zones with the support of aircraft and submarines. OS-54 was an amphibious task force, consisting of two or three landing ships and an escort ship, generally based in Port Said. OS-55 consisted of auxiliary vessels, tankers, floating repair facilities, and other support ships. (58)

THE LIBYAN COUP D'ETAT, 1969

An episode in September 1969 offers a telling example of the Fifth Eskadra's expanding capabilities. Increased access to local port facilities after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War afforded the Soviets the option of conducting extensive exercises at sea, using a greater number and variety of forces than ever before. One set of such exercises, begun in mid-August 1969, saw the number of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean swell to over seventy; (59) this figure included twenty-seven surface combatants at the exercises' peak. (60) During the coup of 1 September of that year in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, in which King Idris's government was ousted by a group of young officers led by Muamar Qaddafi, the heavy local presence of Soviet warships may well have been a crucial, if serendipitous, deterrent to U.S. and British intervention.

Although on the eve of the coup Washington did not see the existence of Wheelus Air Base, just east of Tripoli, as creating a de facto commitment, to the Libyan state--the United States, unlike the United Kingdom, had no defense pact with the Libyan monarchy--a British intervention was a serious possibility. (61) King Idris indeed appealed for U.S. and British assistance during the crisis, but any commitments notwithstanding, no Anglo-American intervention took place. (62)

Semenov recalls that in July 1969 the SSM-equipped cruiser Groznyi (Kynda class/pr. 58) and the surface-to-air missile (SAM) destroyer Bedovyi (Kildin class/pr. 56E) left Sevastopol for a port visit to Cuba. In early August the group was returning to the Mediterranean with the tanker Lena. Meanwhile, several groups of Black Sea Fleet ships from Sevastopol had entered the Mediterranean: the Moskva, the SAM light cruiser Dzerzhinskii (Sverdlov class/pr. 70E), four large submarine chasers, four destroyers, three escort vessels, three large amphibious ships, and three medium amphibious ships with naval infantry onboard. (63)