Set and Drift: Doctrine Matters why the Japanese Lost at Midway

Naval War College Review, Summer, 2001 by Jonathan B. Parshall, David D. Dickson, Anthony P. Tully

Because of the remarkably small cannon-magazine capacities of the Zero fighter, defensive CAP operations necessitated frequent landing, rearming, and launching of engaged fighters. Nagumo clearly appreciated the danger in which he would place his ships during deck spotting of strike force aircraft, in that it created a window of time during which no additional CAP could be cycled. As a consequence, his options were more constrained than has been previously understood--spotting an offensive strike meant hanging his CAP out to dry for nearly an hour at a time when American attacks were constant. As it was, Nagumo's defensive approach very nearly paid off, as only the final American attack delivered telling damage. Indeed, it can be argued that had Nagumo played it a little safer, by putting additional CAP aloft, he might have saved Akagi, Kaga, or Soryu from the American dive-bomber attack. (23)

Japanese carrier doctrine of the time did not specify what to do when suddenly faced with an enemy force within the enemy's striking range while one's own armed and fueled aircraft were still in their hangars. (24) This was a doctrinal failing--although in fairness, both the Japanese and Americans were grappling with this issue. Later in the war, it would have been considered imperative upon detection of an enemy force to immediately launch as many aircraft as possible (whatever their armament) against it. If nothing else, this would get the aircraft out of the hangars, where they presented a dire threat to the carrier itself. Indeed, by 1944 the Japanese Combined Fleet developed just such a command for the signal books in the event of a sudden enemy detection. (25)

In conclusion, we applaud Professor Isom for his efforts in bringing Japanese sources to the fore of the Midway discussion, as well as his presentation of valuable information regarding Japanese rearming procedures. It is also important to bear in mind that he was laboring under the conventional belief that the second-wave strike was spotted and ready to launch on the flight decks, rather than below in the hangars. However, his interpretation of Japanese operations focuses almost exclusively on what it took to arm an airplane and fails to account for the fundamentals of how the Japanese got that plane spotted on the flight deck and then into the air. The article also overlooks the relationship between defensive CAP activities and the inability to mount offense strikes. Its view of carrier operations is therefore both limited and at odds with a great deal of what we know to be true about how Japanese carriers actually fought. Without an adequate appreciation of these factors, a proper assessment of Nagumo's co mmand options and performance cannot be constructed.

Jonathan Parshall is a senior business analyst, consultant, writer, and illustrator. He received his MBA from the University of Minnesota. Anthony Tully is an information systems manager and author of a forthcoming article, "Who Sank the Kaiyo?," to be published by the Naval Institute Proceedings. Messrs. Parshall and Tully appeared in The Search for the Japanese Fleet, Discovery Channel, December 2000. David Dickson sewed in the U.S. Navy and received his law degree in 1968 from Memphis State University. He is the author of The Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 1944 (1975). Presently, all are working on a forthcoming book that will be the first comprehensive English-language account of the Japanese carrier force at Midway using Japanese sources.