President's Forum

Naval War College Review, Autumn, 2000 by Arthur K. Cebrowki

While achieving institutional change has always been an uncertain and perilous undertaking, it is all the more so when we find the foundations of our decision rules to be on shifting sands, as they are now. Put another way, the very factors that make institutional transformation so difficult have made it imperative.

THE ABILITY OF AMERICA'S defense forces to adapt and maintain a process of continuing transformation will be the key to an enduring competitive advantage, yet it remains a vexing challenge. The spring 2000 intersessional conference at the Naval War College focused on "Strategic Change, Transformation, and Military Innovation"--both timely and pertinent issues.

Strategic Change and Contradictions. To say that such efforts are difficult in these times of great change understates the problem and does not adequately characterize this era. Governing rule sets are changing. Well-understood principles are no longer reliable. This is evident at many levels in the form of contradictions. For example, as the sole superpower and as the world's single largest economic force, the United States is a status-quo power in a rapidly changing world. The United States causes much of the change, and we cannot prevent it. We see ourselves as not only a benign giant but also a well-intended one. Yet our dominating global presence disrupts and even destroys the cultures of people with whom we intend stable relations. Another apparent contradiction is that even as the process of globalization, with its unifying forces, moves forward at an ever-quickening pace, we are witnessing a historic rate of growth in the number of political, social, and economic entities. The United States may have m ade the world safe for "demassification" of such entities; that is, there is a sense of safety without mass. Yet another apparent contradiction is that wealth increasingly accrues to those who desert the well understood and highly optimized means of wealth generation in favor of emerging and not-yet-understood concepts.

In the national security and military areas, we see similar evidence of tectonic shifts in the reference framework for decision making. Our military theory springs mainly from the intersection of the industrial age and the concept of mobilizing a nation-at-arms for foreign wars. One is gone, the other defunct. The ramifications are profound but not yet understood. Furthermore, the outcome of military action is no longer closely coupled to the degree of destruction. Even as militaries pursue precision weapons, it is increasingly difficult to see how they can achieve precision effects--that is, those that affect the behavioral aspects of an opponent, especially at the policy level. So while achieving institutional change has always been an uncertain and perilous undertaking, it is all the more so when the foundations of our decision rules are on shifting sands, as they are now. Put another way, the very factors that make institutional transformation so difficult have made it imperative.

The era of great power military competition is only temporarily over. In the meantime, new hedging strategies are required. Uncertainties force us to consider a host of military contingencies across the full spectrum of conflict. Perhaps the most important of these involve adversaries who seek ways to deny us the ability to project military power into their regions of the world.

A second challenge is the accelerating pace of technological development, especially in the area of information-based systems. Rapidly emerging technologies hold the prospect of significant changes in the character of warfare over the coming decades--perhaps leading to what have been termed "revolutions in military affairs." Most of these new technologies have yet to be exploited fully for military use or tested in combat; thus, we have only limited insight into either the opportunities or the challenges they may hold for us.

Overarching these challenges is a U.S. defense budget that is static or even declining relative to need. Some see this as greatly limiting the number of options that the nation can comfortably select for our military force of the future. Others see in the budget pressures an opportunity to open our minds to new options and liberate ourselves from our past.

The Need for Innovation. Our military is not alone in having to face a rapidly changing competitive environment. Over the past two decades, the revolutionary pace of the information age has forced virtually every commercial business to reorganize and adapt--or be overrun by the competition. Those who have adapted successfully can give an indication of the scope and depth of organizational transformation with which the military must deal.

This is not the first time that militaries have faced this type of challenge. The history of warfare is a story of both evolution and revolution in military systems and capabilities, as adversaries have sought to exploit new technologies for competitive advantage on the battlefield. A review of military history reveals that some countries have done well in this competition to innovate but that others have done poorly. Some militaries have failed because they did not see or understand the changes that were occurring in the character of warfare. Others had a clear vision but failed in their efforts to implement that vision. Still others understood what needed to be done but innovated too late or too early. (Yes, it is possible to be right too soon.)