Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats

Naval War College Review, Autumn, 2000 by David M. Goodrich

Schneider, Barry R., and William L. Dowdy, eds. Pulling Back from the Nuclear Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats. London: Frank Cass, 1998. 309pp. $52.50

It is conventional wisdom in some circles that with the demise of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons may no longer be a major factor in the calculus of international relations. This survey of varying perspectives on nuclear proliferation, compiled by Barry R. Schneider and William L. Dowdy, credibly challenges that arguably premature assumption. The editors are, respectively, associate professor of international relations in the Department of Future Conflict Studies, and associate professor of Middle Eastern studies in the Department of International Security Studies, at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Both have devoted a considerable portion of their professional lives to international security issues.

This book grew out of a conference on nuclear proliferation issues jointly sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and the Air War College, held on 26-27 April 1996 at Maxwell. The conference involved numerous nuclear-proliferation experts, many of whom served as principal speakers and presenters. The group was composed of diplomats, regional specialists, policy makers, academics, scientists, senior military officers, and defense professionals from several nations. Many of their papers are contained in this analytical compilation, and all contributors to the book were conference participants. The subject matter includes lessons from previous nonproliferation experience, recent successful nonproliferation efforts, continuing proliferation challenges and risks, progress achieved to date in nonproliferation programs, discussion of possible nonproliferation roles for nongovernmental organizations, and potential counteractions against emerging nuclear states.

As outlined in this work, two seminal events in the late twentieth century had major impacts on global nuclear proliferation: the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the continuing spread of fairly easily attainable nuclear weapons, components, and technology. The two events are, of course, not unrelated. In that regard, leakage of weapons technology and expertise to foreign buyers clearly remains the most worrisome aspect of the current serious Russian internal problems. However, that said, and contrary to the expectations of many analysts, nuclear technology has not spread as rapidly as anticipated. Contributors to this book speculate that this reality is, not surprisingly, the result of multiple, complex, and interacting factors. These include the considerable cost of fielding nuclear weapons, concerns regarding possible preemption by adversaries, fear of isolation by the international community, and growing doubts as to the actual utility of nuclear weapons as deterrents much less as war-fighting tools--par ticularly when weighed against inherent risks.

The preceding cautiously optimistic observations aside, there is a clear recognition by the contributors to this book that there has already emerged a group of nation states that may well prove to be catalysts for nuclear confrontation in the not-too-distant future: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Iraq, and possibly Libya and Syria. Moreover, despite the perhaps understandable balance-of-power motives, there is also the unresolved question of the potentially dangerous and destabilizing nuclear weapons stockpiles possessed by Israel, India, and Pakistan. There also remains what could be the central international policy issue, regarding what to do if a state is discovered in violation of a previous agreement not to develop nuclear weapons.

Several short case studies are given of states that have, variously, developed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, or initiated nuclear weapons development programs and subsequently canceled them, or elected to negotiate regional nuclear-free zones. The book offers valuable insights into factors that seem to motivate these diverse policy choices. The lesson herein may be that no two states react similarly when faced with the nuclear weapons procurement dilemma. Some essays present overviews of evolving national policies on proliferation and nonproliferation as declared by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and of the nuclear arms--reduction program in Russia.

In addition, an American specialist provocatively analyzes the seemingly obdurate refusal by the People's Republic of China to respond to international pressure and previous agreements not to transfer ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technologies abroad. The author's conclusion is that the Chinese government is steadily losing control of its provinces, its military-industrial complex, and the People's Liberation Army. Thus there are emerging in China increasingly independent actors implementing contradictory foreign policies regarding weapons-technology transfers and the considerable profits to be made therefrom.