Building partners' capacity: the thousand-ship Navy

Naval War College Review, Autumn, 2007 by Ronald E. Ratcliff

That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill.

Aristotle, Politics

In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, challenged the world's maritime nations to raise what he called a "thousand-ship navy" to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the twenty-first century. Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen candidly admitted to the assembled chiefs of navy and their representatives from seventy-five countries that "the United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security." (1) He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to students at the College, but he now elaborated the concept:

   Because today's challenges are global in nature, we must be
   collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence
   on the seas and in our need for security of this vast commons. This
   is a requisite for national security, global stability, and
   economic prosperity.

   As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the
   advantages of the sea ... advantages such as mobility, access, and
   sovereignty ....We must now leverage these same advantages of our
   profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the
   security of the domain, we collectively, are responsible for. As we
   combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy--a
   fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of
   all freedom-loving navies of the world. (2)

Nearly two years after the bold proposal for a multinational maritime force, little progress seems to have been made in constituting this "navy-in-being." This article argues that the thousand-ship navy, now more generally referred to within the U.S. Navy as the "Global Maritime Network," or "Partnership," is an idea well worth pursuing. But the Navy is struggling (perhaps even failing) to build support for it, for three reasons. First, it has not invested sufficient resources--monetary, administrative, or intellectual--to achieve the important goals articulated. Second, the Navy does not appear to appreciate fully the nature of the challenges it faces in overcoming the global maritime manifestation of the classic "tragedy of the commons" (which will be discussed below). Third, despite its rhetoric, the service has not made the thousand-ship navy/Global Maritime Partnership (TSN/GMP) a part of its current maritime strategy, which raises doubts as to whether such a concept will be incorporated in the new strategy currently being written. The absence of any mention of the thousand-ship navy in Admiral Mullen's May 2007 testimony before Congress on the status and future of the service seems to belie the importance he has given it in forums involving the international naval community. (3) The lack of such official support for the TSN/GMP has likely been interpreted by nations reluctant to participate as a sign of weakness in American commitment to the concept.

This article will present its argument in three parts. The first will address the goals and objectives of the thousand-ship navy/Global Maritime Partnership that have been communicated in such unofficial venues as the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and Navy Times. The second part will examine the challenges the U.S. Navy faces in convincing the rest of the world to expend limited resources on an international navy. The third will identify specific steps and initiatives that need to be given serious consideration if the potential and goals of the concept are to be realized. Unless the U.S. Navy is willing to move beyond the public-relations program that now seems to substitute for serious commitment, this bold concept risks becoming the maritime equivalent of Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations--that is, it will die, and not because it was a bad idea but because the country that proposed it was not committed to it.

A GLOBAL MARITIME SECURITY NETWORK

The rationale for the TSN has largely been seen within the U.S. Navy as emanating from increased international maritime traffic due to globalization. In late 2005, Navy officials asserted, "Promoting and maintaining the security of the global maritime commons is a key element because freedom of the seas is critical to any nation's long-term economic well-being ....Policing and protecting the maritime commons against a wide spectrum of threats is a high priority for all nations interested in economic prosperity and security that comes from a safe and free maritime domain." (4)