The trouble with mixed motives: debating the political, legal, and moral dimensions of intervention

Naval War College Review, Autumn, 2004 by Susan D. Fink

Ethical determinations regarding authorization and justification were shaped by these contending viewpoints, just as these lenses continue today to color judgments on the decisions of early 2003. One such judgment is that important moral dimensions were not taken account of at the time; in particular, there was insufficient frank discussion of the humanitarian costs of the alternatives of war and of continued coercive diplomacy and containment.

The November 2002 vote on Security Council Resolution 1441 was viewed as a referendum on war with Iraq. France insisted that its vote in favor of the resolution was meant to "strengthen the role of the UN"; (22) this insistence reflected France's interest in strengthening its own international position as a permanent member of the Security Council. The United States and Britain saw UNSCR 1441 as fulfilling the last-resort principle; France and Germany disagreed, countering that "the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled." (23) The Germans insisted that "the unity of the [UN Security] Council is of central importance" and, in light of that imperative, argued for a continuation of containment, sanctions, and no-fly zones. (24) Nonproliferation regimes had not, Berlin felt, been fully exploited; the Germans held that "peaceful means have therefore not been exhausted," that the Security Council was "crucial to world order" in the future, and that war should be avoided. (25) The German approach was thus cooperativist, but because it allowed no military option at all, it was also solidarist, taking the form of an idealized multilateralism.

President Chirac took a moral-exclusivist stance as well, on the necessary source of authority for war. He maintained that the UN was "the only legitimate framework for building peace, in Iraq and elsewhere" and that France would advance its principles through collective action. (26) Other French officials, meanwhile, were arguing that adherence to international law was a moral obligation, that only such law could legitimate the use of force, and that France must advance the idea of collective responsibility. (27) At home, Jacques Chirac's popularity soared in proportion to the anti-American nature of his stance. (28) Just as in the Kosovo case, France's position was thus a moralized power-based approach, with the cooperative tradition in a supporting role.

The British, as they had in Kosovo, insisted upon a sound legal basis for intervention in Iraq. The British attorney general declared that military action would not violate international law, though other lawyers insisted on the opposite. (29) The British people insisted on either proof of the existence of weapons of mass destruction or issuance of a UN mandate. (30) Politicians called for a separate Security Council mandate for the reconstruction of Iraq, in order to avoid a postwar occupation situation; the prime minister accordingly persuaded the Americans to seek a second Security Council resolution for intervention. Yet the British stance was as moral as it was legal. Echoing his approach in 1999, Blair couched the threat as "disorder and chaos" that jeopardized other foreign policy aims such as the alleviation of poverty, protection of the environment, and the promotion of international health. The threat, he held, was embodied in states and groups that "hate our way of life, our freedom, our democracy." (31) As in the Kosovo case, the struggle was not with the people of the Iraqi nation but with "barbarous rulers" who defied collective norms and laws. (32) Thus the British argument, like the German position, was a combination of strong cooperative and solidarity approaches.