Space and the Theater Commander's War - Statistical Data Included

Joint Force Quarterly, Winter, 2000 by Thomas A. Doyne

Since doctrine is oriented on attacking enemy centers of gravity while guarding one's own, planners need an analytical device to link spacepower to centers if spacepower is integrated into the operation plan and order paragraphs. Every CINCSPACE since the mid-1990s has championed the idea of spacepower as a center of gravity, yet many planners have difficulty in treating it as vital because space systems do not shoot bullets or drop bombs. Planners need a simple way of linking spacepower to centers of gravity. One solution is using a planning methodology known as center of gravity-critical capability-critical requirement-critical vulnerability analysis. (1)

Three Models

Sound doctrine and planning need proper organization for successful campaign execution. Structural changes are required to complement the integration of spacepower into the 5-paragraph format of operation plans as well as various orders used for crisis action planning. Joint doctrine gives JFCs the flexibility to organize JTFs by service or function, component, or task force. The unified command plan entrusts responsibility to CINCSPACE as the single focal point of military space operations for regional CINCs. Future command and control of space forces must leverage SPACECOM responsibility to provide global centralized control.

Three possible models might be applied to the problem of command and control, beginning with the Air Force approach. Under this model the chain of command for space forces functions with JFACC as the single JTF focal point. The advantages are congruence with Air Force doctrine and unity of command, but there are disadvantages in implementation. The typical JFACC has no space experience and limited training. Joint aerospace operations centers (JAOCs) are designed to plan and execute the air campaign via the air tasking order. Consequently, the Air Force has been staffing the center with space experts and thus has no need to man and equip the supported staff of a unified command or another functional or service component operations center in the same way. Unfortunately, the demand for space experts outstrips the supply. Lastly, this model will require CINCSPACE to delegate UCP missions to a component (Fourteenth Air Force), which effectively places it over Army and Navy components. Fourteenth Air Force normally has operational control for only Air Force space systems such as the global positioning and defense support program. It is also responsible for much of the space surveillance mission and launch ranges at both Vandenberg Air Force Base and Cape Canaveral Air Station. While making JFACC the single operational focal point for spacepower will provide unity of command, using the Fourteenth Air Force as the central command center would place too heavy a workload on a single functional component.

Another option is forming a joint space operations component or joint space operations task force to provide unity of command to space forces within JTF by providing a single focal point for space support. This command and control architecture is congruent with joint doctrine and gives reachback to SPACECOM for centralized control for space systems. The main disadvantage of a space component/task force commander is operational control. The global nature of space systems prevents transferring control of assets to JTFs. Other questions about such an organization relate to physical residence of this task force in theater and support requirements. The answers will have an impact on JTF time phase deployment database flow and limited transportation resources.