Counterattack

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring-Summer, 2001 by Brian J. Dunn

To the Editor--I appreciated the comments by Eric Michael and Patrick Carroll on my article "Rethinking Army-Marine Corps Roles in Power Projection" (JFQ, Autumn 00), which appeared in your last issue. But neither addressed my central focus: advocating a battle/war division of responsibilities in order to rapidly defeat an unanticipated conventional enemy. My main concern is that we do not have a capability, other than airpower, to fight a strong enemy in the first days of a conflict in an area not previously considered vital. We need to either squelch a small threat decisively and rapidly to keep it from growing--or hold off a serious threat so we can execute a successful halt phase. The Army already has forces where we expect conflict--Europe, the Republic of Korea, and Kuwait. We need the Marines to be ready to go anyplace else.

The expeditionary battle force concept is my suggestion. Army airborne forces are rapidly deployable but are too light for this role by themselves. The Marines, who are already forward deployed at sea, should both accept the battle and complementary urban warfare roles to reduce the pressure on the Army to create its own urban combat forces. Army infantry-heavy light mechanized interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs) will take over this role if the Marines do not step up. IBCTs will give the Army the expeditionary role and in the process degrade the traditional Army warfighting mission of defeating a large, well-equipped conventional enemy. Emphasis on mobility rather than power will gut heavy forces. I have no confidence that we can build future tanks as light as light armored vehicles yet as lethal and survivable as the Abrams. My proposal promotes a proper division of labor and builds on Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) already deployed. Notwithstanding Carroll's justifiable confidence in the power of a Marine light armored reconnaissance company, it is still only a company and a MEU is just a battalion.

And despite Carroll's contention that the Marine Corps is embracing expeditionary warfare, his list of weapons and operating concepts supports deliberate Iwo Jima-style operations rather than quick reaction capabilities in brigade strength. With all due respect, unless a Marine expeditionary brigade is already forward deployed, it will not even arrive in time to fight a battle--let alone win it. Planes are faster than ships,

I am not sure how to address Michael's complaints. I heartily disagree with his boasts of National Guard peacekeeping roles. Peacekeeping harms the active Army and is a particular hardship for Reservists. I applaud the Marines for avoiding it. It is true that for both some leaders and support units peacekeeping provides real-life experience. Our soldiers in the field may be proud of the hard job they perform. Nonetheless, peace operations compromise warfighting capabilities by requiring units to lose their fighting edge performing constabulary roles.

Brian J. Dunn Ann Arbor, Michigan