To the Yalu and back

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring-Summer, 2001 by Stanlis D. Milkowski

The Korean War is a case study in operational art, not only historically but as a paradigm for U.S. strategic thinking. General Douglas MacArthur was the last operational level commander until the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991. (1) Paradoxically, operational planning conducted in a strategic backwater some fifty years ago may have greater applicability to the new security environment than lessons from Desert Storm. The United States must be able to deploy limited forces around the world for ambiguous missions in ad hoc coalitions. It is likely that operational planners may find themselves on unfamiliar terrain, in a theater lacking logistic and intelligence support, and without command and control tailored to the mission, similar to the situation that confronted MacArthur after Inchon.

Was the command and control system that MacArthur employed responsible for the plight of the United Nations Command (UNC) deep inside North Korea in November 1950? In doctrinal terms, the command was defeated when it passed the operational culminating point without gaining its objectives. (2) Accounts variously assign blame for this near catastrophe on MacArthur's hubris, schizophrenia at general headquarters, intelligence failure, or misplaced trust in airpower to isolate the battlefield. Elements of these problems arguably existed, but they offer little understanding of how UNC operations fell into disarray on the eve of the Chinese counterstroke and why miscalculation turned to calamity. The reversal shows that it was a failure of operational command and control more than single-mindedness on the part of MacArthur that made defeat inevitable.

Riding High, Falling Fast

By crossing the 38th Parallel in October 1950, U.N. and South Korean forces launched an aggressive pursuit across a broad front, encountering no serious checks until the surprise Chinese counterattacks. After a period of consolidation and unit boundary adjustment dictated by tactical withdrawals of forward elements, the final offensive began on November 24. Within 72 hours, the Chinese had struck hard at several points on an extended front and threatened to cut off major forces inside North Korea. Though U.N. forces kept lines of communications open and extricated most forces in danger of encirclement, the cost was heavy in terms of casualties, materiel, and loss of hard-won gains in the offensive. By Christmas, UNC found itself almost exactly where it had set out three months earlier. It was an entirely new war.

Although MacArthur received his authority as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), from the Joint Chiefs, and his command included both major Navy and Air Force headquarters, Far East Command (FECOM) headquarters was staffed almost entirely by the Army. In deference to jointness, planning was carried out by a joint strategic plans and operations group (JSPOG), but the lack of balanced representation from all services prevented it from being truly joint. MacArthur was also Commander, U.S. Army Forces Far East (AFFE), though he did not use that title. Thus Lieutenant General Walton Walker, Commander of Eighth Army, was only the senior subordinate commander within AFFE rather than a ground component commander in a joint headquarters.

When Walker became commander of ground forces in July 1950, the area of responsibility of Eighth Army was simply extended to Korea, and this subregion was designated Eighth Army Korea to differentiate it from the base structure. Although Walker effectively exercised control of South Korean army units, he did not have command authority over them. As quickly as a skeleton corps headquarters could be organized in the continental United States, it was rushed to the theater. To achieve the movement, MacArthur needed a corps headquarters separate from Eighth Army. Despite the fear of some that it would be a half-baked affair, he was determined to form a staff with FECOM personnel, even selecting his chief of staff, Major General Edward Almond, USA, to head it. This organization was designated X Corps and assigned one Army and one Marine Corps division that were placed in reserve until the Inchon operation began. Given the circumstances of its origin and the fact that nearly all key staff members were on loan from FECOM headquarters, JSPOG planners assumed that tactical elements of X Corps would be commanded by Walker after linking up with Eighth Army. That assumption proved erroneous.

Change of Mission

While U.N. forces were consolidating their gains at Inchon and breaking out from Pusan, operations north of the 38th Parallel were explicitly authorized, but the directive had one constraint and two caveats. Above all, no forces commanded by MacArthur were allowed to enter Manchuria or the Soviet Union, and no naval or air action could be undertaken against those areas. Moreover, CINCFE was free to undertake operations anywhere in North Korea only so long as there was no sign of entry by major Chinese or Soviet forces. Finally, as a matter of policy, he was prohibited from using non-Korean forces in northern provinces bordering Manchuria and the Soviet Union. As long as these conditions obtained, MacArthur was enjoined "to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel." (3)