The Marine air-ground team at the Chosin Reservoir

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring-Summer, 2001 by John P. Condon

The Marine air-ground team proved its metal in set piece battles during the Korean conflict, including both the defense of the Pusan Perimeter and support of amphibious operations at Inchon. But the maneuver phase of the war presented a new set of challenges. At the time of the Wonsan landing, the Marine Corps learned that it would take part in the dash north to the Yalu River under X Corps, led by Lieutenant General Edward Almond, USA. Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Walton Walker, would do the same in the western portion of the peninsula. The jump-off dates were set for late November. What followed was a severe test for the ability of the Marines to integrate land and air operations in an austere theater, under rapidly changing tactical conditions. The offensive and a counterattack by regular Chinese forces stressed logistics, organizations, and tactics to the breaking point.

Into the Maelstrom

With the concentration of 1st Marine Division north of Hungnam preparing to march to the Yalu River, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, under Major General Field Harris, made plans to consolidate operations at the Yonpo airfield in the Hungnam-Hamhung area. The move was highly anticipated because it would considerably reduce the response time for close air support. On November 6, Marine Aircraft Group-33 (MAG-33) was ordered to Yonpo from Japan. It became operational in time to receive Marine Fighter Squadron-212 (VMF-212) from Wonsan. On November 15, VMF-214 was ordered ashore from USS Sicily and set up at Wonsan with MAG-12.

Because of shortages in shipping, it took a long time to move essential shore-based equipment from storage in Japan. Without this heavy support equipment, many operational and maintenance activities required the Marines to adopt the same improvised methods they used in island hopping campaigns during World War II. That meant that for a considerable period bombs were loaded by muscle power and aircraft were refueled by 440-pound hand pumps from 55-gallon drums. In addition to manhandling fuel, ordnance, and spare parts, maintenance activities were done without benefit of heated workspace as the temperature fell and weather conditions worsened each day. Operating on a small, primitive airfield packed with planes and ringed with frozen mud, Marine ground crews readied sortie after sortie for combat operations.

While Harris organized Marine air support, ground troops prepared to renew the offensive. There had been repeated sightings of Chinese troops well below the Yalu River in late October and early November. Press releases issued by Far East Command, however, claimed that these forces were only volunteers. They usually were observed in small groups in remote areas, but in some instances there were thousands of footprints in the snow. Moreover, in a significant five-day battle November 4-9, 7th Marine Regiment took 62 Chinese prisoners at Chinhung-ni.

The commander of 1st Marine Division, Major General Oliver Smith, conferred with General Almond on November 25. The news from the Eighth Army sector was troubling. The South Korean corps on the Eighth Army right had been overrun. In fact, Walker's whole front was falling back. At the time, intelligence identified five divisions from interrogations of prisoners, and line-crossing agents gave firm indications of even more Chinese immediately to the north. In spite of these signs, Almond ordered Smith to attack on November 27 as planned.

By the time the division offensive was prepared, Marine air support had been put in place. Though a sixth squadron, VMF-323, was still flying off USS Badoeng Strait, the rest of the wing, with five squadrons, was operating from Yonpo, all in close striking distance of potential targets. In addition to fighters, the wing included VMO-6 with both OYs and HO-3S helicopters.

On November 27, the division converged around the Chosin Reservoir, with its command post at Hagaru. Smith attacked on schedule but the lead regiment advanced a mere 2,000 yards when it was stopped by stiff resistance. That night the Chinese attacked the Marine positions in strength from Yudam-ni to Koto-ri. At the same time, a division-sized assault was launched against a three battalion task force of 7th Infantry Division east of the reservoir. Intelligence reports suggested the Chinese force was massive--comprised of 9th Army Group, 3d Field Army with four corps-sized units, and the five divisions previously identified. The communists totaled over 100,000 seasoned Chinese infantry troops. With the Marine divisional units north of Hungnam and Hamhung, plus attached units of the Army and Royal Marines with 20,500 in all, the balance favored the Chinese by better than 5 to 1.

The situation had changed so radically that on November 28, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, brought Walker and Almond to Tokyo for a conference that led to a new strategy. U.N. forces would pull back to a more defensible line to the south. Smith began redeploying and ordered 5th and 7th Marine Regiments from Yudam-ni to Hagaru, the first leg of what would be a long fight to the sea.