The Marine air-ground team at the Chosin Reservoir

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring-Summer, 2001 by John P. Condon

The Air Situation

From the time of the decision to fight south, Fifth Air Force gave 1st Marine Aircraft Wing the sole mission of supporting 1st Marine Division and the rest of X Corps. Backup for additional close support was provided by Combined Task Force 77. Meanwhile, both the Navy and Fifth Air Force tactical squadrons attacked troop concentrations and interdicted approach routes all along the withdrawal fronts of Eighth Army and X Corps. Far East Air Forces coordinated constant requests for air drops of food and ammo, directed aerial resupply of all types from basic supplies to bridge sections, and coordinated casualty evacuation from improvised landing strips at both Hagaru and Koto-ri.

During this phase of the campaign and indeed throughout the entire war, Marine air-ground operations differed significantly from those conducted by other forces. For conventional close air support, the Air Force centralized control of fighter aircraft, then doled out sorties on the basis of preplanned or immediate requests as needed. This method of operation was based on lessons from the campaign in North Africa during World War II, where each ground command was allocated its own air support. As a result, some units in heavy contact lacked adequate support, while aircraft supporting commands not involved in the battle could find no targets.

Air support was coordinated on a centralized basis and apportioned mission-by-mission for most of the European campaign. The Marine system also stemmed from World War II, although with different results. During combat on Guadalcanal and in subsequent action, the Marine Corps found that decentralized control and dedicated fighter support were essential for responsiveness and close coordination. Thus its air arm was considered an integral and inseparable part of the force. The Marines brought this approach to air-ground operations in Korea. Their organization would prove ideal for supporting a fighting withdrawal and covering long columns on the ground which were confined to the winding mountain roads.

From the beginning of the battle to the sea on December 1 to its completion at Hungnam on December 12, air-ground coordination was continuous and effective. During the withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir, the most critical asset may have been the tactical air control party (TACP) of the Marine air control system. Strikes against enemy positions along the route, when ever a column was held up, were under the control of experienced Marine pilots on the ground, known to the flyers in the air delivering the attacks. Other methods were tried repeatedly, but as one veteran put it, "there ain't no substitute for the TACP."

Underlying the air support plan for the operation was the commitment to have a sortie over the key movement at first light. This flight would be assigned to the forward air controller (FAC) of the unit most likely to require immediate close air support. In turn, as soon as that flight was called to a target by TACP, another sortie would be assigned to relieve it on station. That meant that the response time from request to delivery on target could be reduced. The weather had to cooperate, but if minimum visibility and ceiling made the positive delivery of weapons possible, planes were invariably in place and targets were hit in minimum time. When aircraft on station could not eliminate the targets, additional sorties were called from Yonpo, the carrier task force, or suitable aircraft in the area for a diversion from assigned missions. The last option was usually handled by the tactical air direction center (TADC) or tactical air coordinators airborne on the scene.