The Marine air-ground team at the Chosin Reservoir

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring-Summer, 2001 by John P. Condon

The air planning for the second leg drew heavily on the experience gained during the move from Yudam-ni. FACs were again positioned along the column and with each flanking battalion, augmented with two airborne observers who flew ahead and to each side of the advancing column. The addition of a R5D transport configured to carry a complete TADC controlled support aircraft as they reported on station and assigned them to the ground or airborne observers from TACPs, who directed attacks against ground targets. The system worked smoothly and made it possible for the column to keep moving on the road most of the time. By the evening of December 7, the division rear guard was inside the perimeter of 2d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment at Koto-ri. During those two days, the wing flew 240 sorties in support of the X Corps withdrawal, with almost 60 percent conducted in support of the division and most of the balance backing other units in the column. In addition, X Corps received 245 sorties from Combined Task Force 77 and 83 sorties from Fifth Air Force. Navy sorties were almost entirely close support missions and Air Force flights were mostly supply drops. Over 500 additional wounded were also flown out of the Koto-ri strip, although the airfield was even more treacherous than the makeshift strip at Hagaru.

The third leg of the withdrawal, from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni, included a perilous passage through the precipitous Funchilin Pass, plus a blown bridge three miles from Koto-ri that had to be made passable. This situation led to engineering conferences from Tokyo to Koto-ri. A test drop of a bridge section was conducted at Yonpo. A hasty improvisation of parachutes and rigging proved successful and subsequent drops at Koto-ri provided materials to rebuild the span.

The ground and air plans for the descent to Chinhung-ni amounted to essentially using the same cover and column movement coordination as were employed successfully on the first two legs, with the addition of a spoiling attack. 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, from a position in Chinhung-ni, would attack up the gorge and, backed by air support, take the dominating terrain on Hill 1081, which overlooked a major portion of the main route. The attack was set for dawn on December 8, simultaneous with the start of the withdrawal south from Koto-ri by the main body.

A blizzard on the evening of December 7 reduced visibility almost to zero and ruled out air operations the next day. As a result, although movement began on schedule, little progress was made from Koto-ri. The installation of the bridge sections was also delayed. The one bright spot in the day was the complete surprise 1st Battalion achieved on Hill 1081. Using the blizzard as cover, A Company sent two platoons on a double envelopment maneuver, while a third launched a frontal assault to fix the enemy attention. The company seized the strong point on the crest of the hill, wiping out the enemy garrison.

December 9 brought clear skies and good visibility. Starting at daybreak under direction of the airborne TADC, fighters from the wing maintained complete air coverage over the route. The installation of the bridge was also guarded by an air cap. With the completion of the bridge site, the column began its move down to Chinhung-ni on the plain below. Good weather continued the next day and the passage over the tortuous line of march was completed by nightfall. Truck movement from Chinhung-ni to Hungnam began early on December 11. The last unit cleared the town by afternoon. During this period, one milestone for Marine aviation was its first jet squadron to see combat when VMF-311 operated at Yonpo for the last few days of the breakout.