A new twist in unconventional war: undermining airpower

Joint Force Quarterly, Spring-Summer, 2001 by Gary C. Webb

The United States remains at war with Iraq. Since the imposition of no-fly zones, Baghdad has developed a new form of strategic response--unconventional operations targeted at air forces. An American-led coalition exercises dominance over the Iraqi military through air superiority, but this advantage is fragile. We must realize that unconventional warfare against conventional airpower is a potent and serious threat. Downplaying it will lead to faulty, misguided, incomplete, and even irrelevant responses. Interest in the region is too important to risk defeat by a strategy that could be overcome by a more appropriate use of military force.

Out of Weakness

As one author has observed: "Other countries can challenge the United States effectively by fighting indirectly, moving away from our military strength, and avoiding large concentrations of weapons and men that we can locate and destroy." (1) Another has warned that this approach is not beyond even small powers:

The situation, problems, and challenges of the environment, popular support, organization, unity, and external support must be set forth as cogently, comprehensively, and clearly as possible. Once this is done, an overall counterstrategy tailored to relevant problems can be devised. (2)

The task for any would-be challenger of U.S power is to focus limited assets on a point that is both vulnerable and decisive.

Unconventional warfare is a time-honored method of confronting an enemy with superior military capability. Successful stratagems define the capabilities and will of an enemy, determine a style of engagement, and establish an overarching approach to affecting the resolve of the dominant force. The taxonomy used by Mao Tse-tung for revolutionary war presents one of the simplest and most logical prescriptions for guerrillas. (3) His phases of revolutionary war include organizing and preserving forces; challenging enemy dominance and will indirectly, covertly, and persistently; and challenging enemy dominance. As practiced by Baghdad unconventional warfare has adhered to this three-phase approach and resulted in an effective counterstrategy.

Preparing the Battlefield

In the initial phase, guerrillas develop doctrine and tactics, acquire technology to challenge enemy will, and create a political base through diplomacy, manipulation, and propaganda. They gather strength and support but do not directly challenge dominance.

While the dominant force remains complacent in its ability to muster overwhelming power, guerrillas seek any possible niche to develop the means to resist. The Iraqis, for example, train at night because allied forces maintain direct control of the skies by day with active patrols and exert only indirect dominance at night by monitoring operations inside the country. Allowing training at night seems a small concession, but it erodes coalition resolve and establishes legitimacy for Iraqi actions. Fighting at night is a new concept and capability for Iraq and represents a tentative step towards developing both the will and capacity to act.

With regard to acquiring the necessary weapons, electronic warfare has emerged as a major way of undermining an air campaign. Electronic means of fighting include highlighting aircraft, uncoordinated missile launches, and the threat of vectoring conventional fighters for aerial combat. As Iraq gains experience, observing the operational practices of the forces supporting Northern and Southern Watch, its options for employing limited electronic warfare assets multiply. It can use electronic intelligence to hide real attack assets or deny electronic intelligence through alternative tactics and unconventional employment. The most effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum is for U.S. forces to not know when they have been attacked. This can be achieved by using friendly and enemy electronic emissions to gather data to evaluate response capabilities of coalition aircraft as well as command, control, intelligence, and targeting systems, all without necessarily inflicting physical harm. When Iraqi radars illuminate aircraft, U.S. forces react to the threat and the enemy documents this action. Moreover, Iraq may lull America into complacency. Repeated activity may be evaluated as nonthreatening. As coalition forces do not react, they will be at risk.

The goals of these initially subtle operations may vary. They could be to force the enemy to remove part of its dominant, forces from a theater or compel it to maintain a presence and provide more lucrative targets for future unconventional operations. On the one hand, chipping away at the enemy force structure could ultimately bring about a loss of military dominance, or the escalating costs of maintaining a dominant force may weaken political will. In tentatively reaching for these goals, the guerrilla will use enough force to constitute a threat but not enough to require serious retribution. Iraqi goals appear to be to break containment and the force of U.N. resolutions by undermining the legitimacy of U.S. efforts abroad or eroding domestic support for sanctions and military action. Baghdad may wish to convey that air operations are costly and counterproductive.