Supreme command in the 21st century - Joint Warfighting

Joint Force Quarterly, Summer, 2002 by Eliot A. Cohen

The unequal dialogue is necessary for three reasons that are constant through history. The first is the profoundly political nature of war. When Clausewitz stated that "war is only a branch of political activity ... it is in no sense autonomous," (4) he made a radical and correct claim. Much in war, even seemingly tactical details, may have political consequences. Churchill found himself presiding over decisions on increasing the speed of transatlantic convoys by two knots. The issue confronting the Royal Navy was tradeoffs between greater risks of exclusion from faster convoys and greater safety for those in them. At a time when every shipload contributed to the survival of Britain, the question of what risks were acceptable became political, as did decisions on what kinds of weapons to use, what sort of collateral damage to inflict, and what level of casualties to accept. The only issue is whether politicians rely on the assessments by generals or their own judgment which, in all likelihood, is better; but, in any case, political leaders are ultimately responsible. For example, if joint planners make decisions (rather than recommendations) on what kind of forces are acceptable to another nation, or what kinds of losses the American public can put up with, they are making choices for which they are neither particularly qualified nor ultimately responsible.

Active civilian control also appears because of a peculiar aspect of military professionalism, uncertainty. Generals and admirals often disagree vehemently on operational and tactical choices, and the stakes are sometimes too high for civilians to merely put faith in the senior officer present. The stakes have not been sufficiently high in recent wars to demand civilian intervention, but the potential remains. During World War I, Georges Clemenceau was compelled to arbitrate between his two senior generals, Ferdinand Foch and Philippe Petain, over doctrine for defensive warfare. That case involved only one service: rivalries today among services and their perspectives on joint warfare rarely allow one to speak of a single view on the conduct of operations.

Finally, the uncomfortable truth is that those who often rise to the top in peacetime may be unsuited for high command in war. They may be too narrow, indecisive, or tolerant, or they may be insufficiently callous or merely unlucky. In the heat of war, politicians must reshuffle or relieve senior officers. That is a hard judgment to make: not all defeated generals are incompetent and not all victorious ones are able. Successful wartime statesmen create winning military establishments by forming sound judgments on character and personality. It is very different to determine whether a surgeon or engineer is professionally qualified. And only through intense dialogue can civilian leaders hope to evaluate the quality of military subordinates.

The norm for healthy civil-military relations at the top of government, then, is tension and what often looks like interference because civilians do things that can indicate a lack of confidence in their commanders. The resulting friction is real. One should note parenthetically that not every instance of civil-military comity indicates a healthy relationship. Recall that General Westmoreland wrote of the President, "I have never known a more thoughtful and considerate man than Lyndon B. Johnson," an indication that both men failed to manage their relationship. (5) A bland pleasantness in civil-military relations may also mean that civilians are evading their responsibilities or that soldiers have succumbed to the courtier mentality rather than that true harmony exists.