The outlook for air warfare. - The Transformation of American Air Power by Benjamin S. Lambeth - book review

Joint Force Quarterly, Summer, 2002 by Mark Clodfelter

The Transformation of American Air Power by Benjamin S. Lambeth Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000. 320 pp. $29.95 [ISBN: 0-8014-3816-0]

As Benjamin Lambeth states in The Transformation of American Airpower: "Operation Desert Storm was a watershed event in modern American military history." For the author, the Persian Gulf War changed airpower from a force geared towards either nuclear war or support of the Army to one that could achieve independent strategic effects in a conventional conflict by attacking enemy military capabilities. He argues that this transformation should have a profound impact on how the United States fights in the future.

Transformation hinges on many factors. Stealth, high accuracy from standoff ranges, and information dominance are cornerstones. A new mindset is essential--one that no longer assumes strategic attacks are raids on industrial or leadership targets, but rather on the key assets of fielded forces. That mindset contends that the concept of airpower as only a supporting element of ground forces no longer applies, given the technological wizardry that now enables the Air Force to shape the deep battle. In addition, according to Lambeth, transformation is predicated on fighting a major theater war against a conventional enemy which employs armor and mechanized forces.

The underlying thesis in The Transformation of American Airpower also defines military aviation broadly--as a blend of hardware and intangibles such as doctrine, concepts of operation, training, tactics, leadership, adaptability, and experience. Spacepower falls under this definition of airpower, and Lambeth devotes a chapter to "The Synergy of Air and Space." He further claims that airpower is inseparable from battlespace information and intelligence. Lastly, the author does not limit himself to the Air Force. "Airpower, properly understood, knows no color of uniform." He gives considerable attention to the development of air components within the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps following the Vietnam War.

For airpower professionals and novices alike, there is much that is good, indeed superb, in this book. The chronological review of American airpower since Vietnam is masterful. Relying on a mix of primary and secondary sources as well as his own expertise as a defense analyst who has logged 280 flights in 35 types of aircraft, Lambeth spins a narrative that reads easily. While much of his work highlights technological developments, he adroitly explains the essence of new capabilities without getting mired in mind-numbing detail. The book is organized logically in broad chapters with a liberal use of subheadings to make the text readily accessible. These include "Red Flag and Its Offshoots" and "Tank Plinking and Its Impact" in the chapter on Desert Storm, and "The Promise of Space Power in New Era Warfare" and "Stray Weapons and the Loss of Innocents" in the chapter on Kosovo.

The author complements solid organization and clear style with an argument that is even-handed and well-reasoned. He takes pains to present both sides of an issue. On Vietnam he states: "There is no denying that the American defeat in Southeast Asia was, first and foremost, a product of a flawed strategy and a lack of abiding national commitment and purpose." Then he adds: "... U.S. air operations throughout most of the war also leave little room for doubt that there were significant deficiencies in the character of the American air weapon, in the appropriateness of its use in many cases, and in the organization and ability of its wielders to make the most effective use of it." Lambeth is mindful of the Army view in the debate over roles and missions after Kosovo: "The problem is not simply one of petty bickering over rice bowls, as interservice rivalry is so often portrayed as being, but rather one of honest disagreement among professionals who find themselves viewing the world through very different perceptual filters."

Yet the filters used by Lambeth for both Vietnam and Kosovo call into question the ultimate viability of his transformation thesis. He says that his analysis "concentrates on airpower's combat potential in major theater wars, as opposed to smaller-scale operations and irregular conflicts such as urban combat, since it is the former situations in which airpower has registered its greatest effects and is most likely to prove pivotal in determining combat outcomes." Then he devotes part of his book to Vietnam, particularly the predominantly guerrilla war from 1964 to 1968. He also devotes a long chapter to Kosovo, which he acknowledges was fought by a dispersed enemy that waged irregular warfare in which only a few troops could terrorize a village with ethnic cleansing.

The author admits that many factors were likely key in the decision by Slobodan Milosevic to capitulate, and that the most discomfiting factor "may well have been what he perceived, rightly or wrongly, to have been the prospect of an eventual NATO ground intervention of some sort." Yet he contends that "the campaign's successful outcome despite its many frustrations suggested that U.S. airpower may now have become capable enough to underwrite a strategy of incremental escalation irrespective of the latter's inherent inefficiencies." He continues,