National interests and mil-to-mil relations with Indonesia - JFQ Forum - military relations

Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn, 2002 by John B. Haseman

Between 1966 and 1981, Indonesia acquired USS Claud Jones-class destroyers; landing ship tanks; F-5 and OV-10 aircraft; most of its fleet of C-130s; tanks, armored personnel carriers, and reconnaissance vehicles; a major communications network; and transport vehicles. From 1978 to 1981, it received more training dollars than any other nation while sending hundreds of officers to U.S. courses annually. America trained Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI)--the Indonesian military--in the use of new weapons systems and upgraded intelligence. It was the most comprehensive period of military engagement, particularly for weapons transfers.

Mutual Interests

Indonesia started to have second thoughts about close military ties with the United States. Its leaders counseled restraint, and its army strongman instituted a policy that amounted to learn, but don't copy. General Leonardus Benyamin ("Benny") Moerdani was one of the most powerful, charismatic, and influential officers in the military. In the 1960s, he jumped into West Irian to harass Dutch forces; his advance to the top of ABRI appeared preordained. By the 1980s he controlled the intelligence apparatus, and leadership of the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) made him second only to President Soeharto. But Moerdani was wary of the close ties with Washington and counseled backing away from the United States.

His influence held sway throughout the 1980s, when he served as head of BAIS and then as ABRI commander in chief. For ten years, contact between the U.S. and Indonesian militaries declined precipitously compared to the previous 15 years. Virtually all mobile training teams were directly related to major weapons purchases. Navy visits were almost unknown.

The 1980s also witnessed change in the IMET program. Student selection policy, which American officers close to Indonesia felt was the most critical component of the military-to-military relationship, was modified. Many students had been selected for their ability and achievement, assuring that the best and brightest future leaders went to the United States. Under Moerdani, the emphasis changed to comparative study, by which officers who graduated from Indonesian schools attended American courses to determine their content and applicability for professional military education in Indonesia. This policy took the best and brightest out of consideration for U.S. schooling because promising officers did not want to forego career-advancing assignments. Thus the typical student changed from being a front-runner for leadership to a professional educator--an important contact, but hardly a way to get to know the future leaders of the armed forces of another country.

This new policy was designed to isolate Indonesian officers from the frustration and envy of exposure to sophisticated weaponry which they could not afford. It recognized that American doctrine and strategy were inappropriate but revealed a lack of faith in the ability of officers to filter out unneeded information while improving ABRI professionalization. Many analysts suggested that Moerdani did not want young officers exposed to concepts like civilian control of the military and democracy in a culturally diverse society.