National interests and mil-to-mil relations with Indonesia - JFQ Forum - military relations

Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn, 2002 by John B. Haseman

There ensued a scorched-earth campaign that was even more brutal than activities waged by militias before the voting. Carefully planned, it featured standard tactics used in black operations over the years. But by then U.N. personnel and foreign observers with cameras and camcorders, cellular phones, and the internet, as well as a willingness to speak out, revealed the callousness of the campaign and support of the armed forces. International condemnation was swift. Denials were met with open disbelief, and disrepute enveloped the military establishment.

Congress immediately canceled the IMET program, the President halted military sales, and PACOM ended training. Except for diplomatic contact in Jakarta, military-to-military relations stopped. The ill-conceived operation to frighten East Timor into remaining part of Indonesia, and the out-of-control vengeance that followed, ended half a century of fruitful contact.

Single-Issue Policy

The violence perpetrated in East Timor during 1999 had smaller versions elsewhere. The troubled province of Aceh in far northwestern Sumatra has been convulsed by separatists bent on independence and a military determined to maintain national unity, particularly after the loss of East Timor. Sectarian and ethnic violence flared in many areas where pent-up emotions constrained by Soeharto were vented in tragic ways. Civilian casualties numbered in the thousands. The military, smarting from domestic criticism for past human rights abuses, was criticized both for failing to act strongly enough against perpetrators of violence and for being too fierce when it did act.

Meanwhile, Indonesia was dealing with political and economic challenges in its transition from autocracy to democracy. Poised to become the third-largest democracy in the world, Jakarta was receiving U.S. assistance to help its institutions assume a more effective role. Help flowed to most groups except the military. Widely seen as the most powerful, disciplined, and organized of the nation's elites, the armed forces received virtually no tangible encouragement.

The forces of the largest and most moderate Muslim country became an important player in the global war on terrorism after 9/11. Counterterrorist cooperation began to trump human rights in the formulation of American policy toward Indonesia. Once again effective military-to-military relations became important to U.S. objectives.

Plans disclosed by the Bush administration in August 2002 and legislation approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee reveal that the United States is planning to provide $50 million to the Indonesian police and armed forces between 2002 and 2006. Almost all the funding will go to the national police to upgrade their ability to combat terrorism through better intelligence, education and training, and equipment and facilities. The largest amount of approved funding, $12 million, is earmarked for a counterterrorism unit. Another $4 million in 2002 funds is intended for training and $31 million will be provided in FY03 and FY04 for training and modernization.