Israel's strategy for combating Palestinian terror

Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn, 2002 by Jacob Amidror

Many observers think that Israel does not have a clear and coherent strategy in confronting the Palestinians who are attempting to force their demands on Israel by violence, especially against civilians. It seems that Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are caught in a Sisyphusian dilemma whereby defensive operations are conducted to reduce terrorism. Although this mission is critical, it does not provide direction for a conflict that the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon, refers to as the most important since the War of Independence. Moreover, fighting terror has become more complicated after human bombers became major instruments. Nonetheless, it is the priority of every soldier and commander, and critical to achieving strategic goals.

Origins of Strategy

No document articulates the current strategy, partly because Israel does not have a tradition of producing them. Drafting such strategy is complicated by the omnipresence of the international media, under whose gaze the success and failure of technical and operational practices are revealed. This exposure impacts on strategic planning and decisionmaking. Plans require time to implement. During the Grapes of Wrath campaign in 1996, the mistaken firing of some artillery salvos, which killed 100 Lebanese civilians, forced an end to the operations before they achieved all strategic goals. When the goals are made abundantly clear, commanders on all levels are less likely to make errors that harm strategic aims.

While Israel was still negotiating with the Palestinians, who were engaging in premeditated violence, the goals were less clear--some might say confused. But since the first government of Ariel Sharon was formed, policy statements and actions appear to present a more coherent strategy. Theoretically, it would be preferable if strategy was defined from the top down, complete in every detail. But it evolves gradually through a process of trial and error, a less orderly approach but one that often reflects political and diplomatic realities.

Palestinians, in a gambit seen by most parties as illogical, initiated waves of violence rather than diplomatic counteroffers. Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered far more than any Israeli leader to date, including over 95 percent of Judah and Samaria, 100 percent of Gaza, sovereignty over parts of East Jerusalem, and the ingredients of autonomy as an independent state. Although it was legitimate for the Palestinians not to accept the deal, there were certainly grounds for continuing to negotiate. It is also clear that Barak was ready to talk, as indicated by his agreement to a meeting in Taba, although by then the Palestinian Council President, Yasser Arafat, had launched the war of terror. Moreover, as the Taba process revealed, Barak was ready for more concessions. But Arafat was not satisfied and unleashed the torrent of violence which he had publicly foresworn years before.

The Palestinian leader chose violence over negotiations because he could not give up certain demands, either because it is writ permanently into his character as the raison d'etre for the Palestinian struggle or because he might destabilize his own position by upsetting various factions. The Israeli misunderstanding stems from a belief that since Arafat had an independent state within his grasp, he would make concessions. But instead he decided to wage war when it became clear that, while Israel was yielding, the Palestinian side would not get everything it demanded. Now it seems obvious that Arafat truly thought the Israelis would collapse under a wave of continuous terror and would make concessions that they were not ready to make in peacetime negotiations.

Arafat believed that violence would achieve more after Camp David. His assessment that Israel could be pressured into greater concessions was shared not only by Palestinians but others in the Arab world. This perspective arose because Israel did not react during the Persian Gulf War, went to Madrid against its will to avoid friction with the United States, made concessions at Oslo in 1993, and crossed lines that were interpreted as a retreat from its basic principles. Furthermore, because Israel turned over Hebron after the Tunnel Riots and did not end talks even when promises were broken on the first day, there was a perception that Israel was war-weary and desperate. Finally, the unilateral IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 was the straw that broke the camel's back, furthering the view that Israel could no longer stomach casualties.

There are five elements in Israeli strategy: altering perceptions among Arabs (particularly Palestinians), negotiating with responsible Palestinians to achieve a mutually beneficial agreement, reasserting the ultimate responsibility of the state to protect its citizens, destroying terror by force, and engendering international support.

The Arab Mindset

The result of the war on terrorism must change the outlook of Arab nations, and especially among Palestinians. Israel must regain credibility to make it clear that retreats or concessions will not be made while under fire, and that force--military or terrorist--will never change its position. Israelis are ready to negotiate, but neither threats nor violence will evoke concessions.