Paralyzed or pulverized? The fall of the Republican Guard

Joint Force Quarterly, April, 2005 by Howard D. Belote

Television viewers around the world witnessed the symbolic end of Saddam Hussein's regime on April 9, 2003, as U.S. Marines helped Iraqi citizens destroy a statue of the dictator in Baghdad. Coming 3 weeks after the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the scene seemed to vindicate the "fast and final" campaign plan of General Tommy Franks, USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)--a rapid, two-pronged attack along the Tigris-Euphrates crescent.

The statue's fall may also have validated tenets of classical military theory. With crowds dancing in the streets and Saddam in hiding, the regime appeared paralyzed by the rapid approach and seizure of the capital. In his seminal work, Strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart argued for precisely that effect--a psychological paralysis created by land maneuver. As Army V Corps and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force fought through regular and paramilitary resistance, bypassed Iraqi strongholds, and quickly pressed Baghdad, the regime could not respond. On the surface, then, the campaign plan appeared to be a textbook application of Liddell Hart's indirect-approach theory.

Appearances can be deceiving. In conjunction with the ground maneuver, the coalition air component conducted its own multifaceted operations, which, according to air component Commander Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley, USAF, ran the gamut from "strategic attack, to interdiction, to close air support, to resupply." This includes joint and international airpower assets. Significantly, Moseley's air plan focused not on breaking the regime's will or merely supporting a ground advance. Instead, as the general said, it focused on destruction: "I find it interesting when folks say we're softening them up. We're not softening them up. We're killing them." (1) Rather than paralyzing the enemy, Moseley sought to engage him in decisive battle--as Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz suggested nearly two hundred years ago.

Moseley's words are important for theorists and campaign strategists, for they suggest a role reversal between airpower and landpower and highlight joint success. Furthermore, they suggest a rethinking of contemporary airpower theory, much of which has focused on paralysis. Through this apparent contradiction--an indirect (although aggressive) ground scheme of maneuver, coupled with a direct air attack--Clausewitz appears to explain the joint Iraqi Freedom campaign more fully than Liddell Hart. This essay compares the theorists' concepts and analyzes Iraqi Freedom in their terms. Which theorist better describes the character of war and thereby points out lessons for future conduct?

The Theories and Iraqi Freedom

Liddell Hart and Clausewitz occupy opposite ends of the theoretical spectrum. Indeed, Liddell Hart disdained Clausewitz and explicitly wrote to overturn what he called "the prime canon of military doctrine ... that 'the destruction of the enemy's main forces on the battlefield constituted the only true aim in war.'" (2) Influenced by the horrific trench warfare along the Western Front in World War I, and with an eye toward a better postwar peace, Liddell Hart sought to minimize death and destruction. Believing that one should "subdue the opposing will at the lowest war-cost and minimum injury to the postwar prospect," he argued "it is both more potent, as well as more economical, to disarm the enemy than to attempt his destruction by hard fighting." Therefore, the strategist "should think in terms of paralyzing, not killing," and should use the indirect approach "to upset the opponent's balance, psychological and physical, thereby making possible his overthrow." (3)

The Iraqi Freedom ground scheme of maneuver dovetailed with Liddell Hart's indirect approach, which held that "no general is justified in launching his troops to a direct attack upon an enemy firmly in position." (4) Although Soldiers and Marines clearly fought a number of vicious engagements, the land component plan sought to minimize direct contact before Baghdad. Lead elements of 3d Infantry Division's 7th Cavalry Regiment pushed 100 miles into Iraq by March 21--the first full day of the ground war. Lieutenant General William Wallace, Commander, V Corps, planned to bypass towns and admitted surprise at the Iraqi willingness "to attack out of those towns toward our formations, when my expectation was that they would be defending those towns and not be as aggressive." (5) As 1st Marine Expeditionary Force advanced on the right--and after a brief pause following tremendous sandstorms--V Corps encircled, fought, and passed enemy concentrations at Nasiriyah and Najaf. U.S. forces drew within 50 kilometers of Baghdad by April 2, with the Army southwest near Karbala, and the Marines southeast near Al Kut. Two days later, V Corps seized Baghdad International Airport, with follow-on forces eliminating positions bypassed by 3d Infantry Division. Only 5 days later, after destroying remnants of armored divisions between al Kut and Baghdad, 3d Infantry Division and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force linked up in the capital and Saddam's statue fell. Along the way, by moving quickly, exploiting an information campaign, and bypassing engagements, coalition forces achieved one of General Franks' operational objectives for a better peace, "to prevent the destruction of a big chunk of the Iraqi people's future wealth." Liddell Hart would have approved of the CENTCOM commander's economical approach. It saved lives on both sides and retained Iraqi oilfields for postwar reconstruction.