Center of gravity and asymmetric conflict: factoring in culture

Joint Force Quarterly, Oct, 2005 by John W. Jandora

* What are the tradeoffs between coopting at the regional or subregional versus the country level?

* How does the stabilization force contain the tribes that cannot be coopted, for whatever reasons?

These are not questions for the military alone. They require interagency and bilateral coordination to answer and convert into a strategic plan. However, the reality is that the military is engaged and often makes decisions about who is worth training, who cannot be trusted, who gets hired, which areas to cordon and search, or where a project is initiated. The military also regularly gains information on tribal power dynamics and crafts its own ad hoc models to make sense of it. Lastly and perhaps most significantly, the military is sustaining discussion on the potentiality and actuality of coopting tribal leaders. Operational and tactical commanders and their troops must deal with the dynamics of tribalism despite the lack of an integrated strategic plan.

Critiquing Extremist Doctrine

What of the center of gravity in the clientele version of jihadism? From what has been discussed, it appears that it is neither the person nor the legend of Osama bin Laden. If it were, one would expect to find doctrinal cohesion among the mujahideen in the camps supposedly run or supported by al Qaeda and between it and those remote groups who are said to respond to bin Laden's direction. Yet one finds evidence of doctrinal discord and of bin Laden's indifference to it--of his willingness to make use of even those he considers beyond the pale of Islam. (5) If it is not leadership, then perhaps al Qaeda's center of gravity is its aggregated capacity to project terror. However, this recourse leads to consideration of critical capabilities or resources, not center of gravity per se. Besides, al Qaeda's resources are of very low density and of various technological levels and are therefore relatively easy to move, conceal, replace, reschedule, or retool. There is perhaps a more subliminal dynamic at work--the possibility that the center of gravity of bin Laden's network equates to the word qacida (corrupted into qaeda). The Arabic word has numerous meanings--basic and extended, concrete and metaphoric. It can designate base in the concrete sense of foundational or operational base; it can also designate fundamental principle. Thus, it connotes the same two dimensions, physical and moral, that were pertinent in the discussion of tribal authority. As a two-dimensional force, al Qaeda's critical capabilities are to uphold radical interpretations of the jihad tenet, inspire complementary actions (strikes), and covertly gain new adherents to Islamist radicalism.

Compared to the tribal case, however, the physical dimension of al Qaeda is diffuse--even more so than it had been--lacking geographic, institutional, or temporal consistency. Prior to the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, the al Qaeda network was present in many countries in the form of mosques creating jihad-adepts and training camps generating jihadist operatives. The command center and main concentration of manpower were in Afghanistan. Consequent to Enduring Freedom and regional cooperation in the war on terror, mosque preaching was censured, and camps were abandoned. The militant leaders and their followers went into hiding and changed sites as needed to avoid detection. Nonetheless, capabilities in tradecraft, communications, financing, and arms procurement were conserved through better concealment techniques or modified procedures. Terrorist strikes have continued, and often it is such atrocities that first indicate presence in an area.