Applying lessons of Hurricane Katrina

Joint Force Quarterly, Jan, 2008 by Gregory A.S. Gecowets, Jefferson P. Marquis

There are three basic approaches to closing the gap. State and Federal officials can accelerate the timing of requests for assistance (RFA) and requests for forces (RFF) by enabling earlier decisions and improving decision processes. Response agencies can alter capabilities by posturing more resources or by moving existing resources more quickly. Finally, the U.S. Government and public can change the shape of the response gap by decreasing the need for external assistance through better preparation and early intervention.

Recent Reforms

Reforms to national plans and capabilities have been initiated by local, state, and Federal governments, as well as within the private sector and by nongovernmental organizations. These improvements reflect all three approaches to closing the gap. This section summarizes the reforms enacted in 2005 and 2006, focusing on actions taken by the Federal Government. Again, these examples are illustrative and not intended as a comprehensive report card of post-Katrina corrective actions. Discussing these changes within the Catastrophic Incident Response framework will demonstrate how they can be used to reduce the gap in both a warned and an unwarned scenario.

Disaster Framework. National incident management and command and control structures are fundamentally unchanged since Katrina. In most cases, Governors must still request Federal assistance before it can be provided. Additionally, these national structures continue to rely on interagency and intergovernmental coordination to manage response activities at the regional and national levels; incident command is only used for on-scene emergency management.

With respect to military organization, unity of command is still unlikely unless the President invokes Chapter 15 of Title 10 (Insurrection Act). The National Guard has continued reorganization into state joint force headquarters, and the National Guard Bureau has trained "dual status" Title 10/32 (Federal/ state) commanders. However, this concept of operations has never been implemented in a disaster response, and Governors remain reluctant to cede control of National Guard forces to Federal command.

Effect on the gap: none. This continues to be an issue in interagency reform discussions.

Triggers for Response. The NRP's catastrophic incident guidance and FEMA's pre-landfall policy for major hurricanes have been clarified. The Catastrophic Incident Annex was primarily designed to address catastrophic events involving little or no warning, such as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons of mass destruction or large magnitude earthquakes. The annex was modified in May 2006 to encompass other incidents projected to have catastrophic implications (for example, a major hurricane). This change permitted the Federal Government to proactively respond to warned catastrophes by predeploying tailored packages and resources This early execution policy saw its first use in August 2007 as Hurricane Dean briefly threatened to make landfall along the Texas coast as a Category 5 storm.