Applying lessons of Hurricane Katrina

Joint Force Quarterly, Jan, 2008 by Gregory A.S. Gecowets, Jefferson P. Marquis

Approximately 25,000 Active duty forces were made available for hurricane response operations in 2006, including four FEMA support packages (provided by U.S. Joint Forces Command) that could be put on a weeklong prepare-to-deploy order. (8) The National Guard spent $900 million on new communications and transportation equipment. It also borrowed $500 million worth of equipment from the Active duty military to restock its units for civil support missions. The Guard shifted thousands of trucks, Humvees, and other supplies to states where storms were considered more likely to strike. Increased supplies can present challenges as well. For example, as many as 6 million MREs stockpiled near potential hurricane victims in 2006 reportedly spoiled because of a shortage of warehouse and refrigeration space, and FEMA had to dispose of thousands of pounds of ice. (9)

Effect on the gap: warned and unwarned scenario--raises level of state and Federal capabilities available for use in a response.

Preparedness. The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina increased awareness of the need for improved disaster preparedness in general and hurricane preparedness in particular. DHS conducted an assessment of catastrophic plans with 131 states and urban areas (to include focus on the Nation's 75 largest urban areas). (10) Federal, state, and local officials worked to plug holes in gulf state hurricane plans. Using Louisiana as an example, the Federal Government prepared to help move up to 80,000 people by bus and 61,000 by plane or train--almost everyone in the region without cars, including tourists. In addition, DOD provided contracting and logistics planning support to FEMA. This included contracts with suppliers to deliver diesel fuel and gasoline for generators and vehicles along hurricane escape routes. (11)

Disaster response exercises conducted by Federal, state, and local governments in 2006 fostered collaboration among responder organizations. These included Ardent Sentry 06/Positive Response 06-2, sponsored by U.S. Northern Command and the Joint Staff, which were aligned with Arizona and Michigan state exercises, and the DHS Hurricane Preparedness Tabletops, involving 5 FEMA regions, approximately 20 states, and numerous state, Federal, military, and private participants. A common theme in all these exercises was the need for a coherent public communications strategy that fostered citizen awareness prior to a major incident and filled the information void as early as possible after the event.

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Effect on the gap: warned scenario--change the requirement; unwarned scenario--no major effect. Significant focus on hurricane preparedness did not enable major planning and education campaigns in other areas of the country. However, the DHS 2007 Spills of National Significance exercise is aligned with the New Madrid Seismic Zone through the Midwestern states and should assist in this area.

Legislative Change. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007 contained a revision to the Insurrection Act that could have major consequences for the national response to catastrophic events. These changes provide explicit Presidential authority to deploy Federal armed forces, including federalized National Guardsmen, in response to a Katrina-like catastrophe. This may be done without a Governor's consent if the President determines that "domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining public order." (12) The law seems to strengthen the Federal Government's power to direct the national response in certain catastrophic situations. If invoked, it could serve to align the total military response under one Active duty commander, achieving unity of command and contributing to the government's overall unity of effort.