Developing joint counterinsurgency doctrine: an airman's perspective

Joint Force Quarterly, April, 2008 by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Anybody who thinks that you can win these kinds of things in one dimension is not being honest.

--General Peter Schoomaker, USA (1)

How does the U.S. military plan to win in Iraq? According to some, "The Book" on Iraq is the Army's new Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency. (2) Though this manual may have been meant as "simply operational level doctrine for two Services," (3) as one contributor insists, it quickly became viewed as much more. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), reflecting the received wisdom of many senior leaders (and probably the public at large), describes FM 3-24 as the "blueprint of U.S. efforts in Iraq today." (4)

FM 3-24 does superbly articulate a thoughtful landpower perspective on the complicated challenge of counterinsurgency (COIN). It does not purport to be, however, a full-dimensional joint approach. Indeed, the official Department of Defense (DOD) announcement unveiling the doctrine crowed that it "was a real team effort of Army and Marine writers," (5) underlining the absence of the other Services, who emphasize the air, space, sea, and cyberspace warfighting domains.

The result? Among other things, the discussion of airpower is largely relegated to a 5-page annex in the nearly 300-page text. Moreover, that short discussion inexplicably discourages the use of the air weapon in a way not applicable to other fires. Ironically, notwithstanding the doctrine, airstrikes in Iraq soared fivefold in 2007.

COIN operations present the kind of multifaceted problem that defies solution by any one component. Despite the ferocious efforts and eye-watering valor of America's Soldiers and Marines, the various ground-centric COIN strategies attempted in Iraq over the years may have proven costly and time-consuming. Exploiting the full capabilities of the whole joint team would seem the wiser course given the complexities of COIN.

Accordingly, in late May of 2007, the four Services finally agreed to write joint doctrine for COIN. This development presents the ideal opportunity to meld the strengths of the whole joint team into a unified doctrinal concept. Significantly, Inside the Pentagon announced that the "Army will lead the pan-service effort." (6) Alone, this is not problematic; however, it does raise concerns when juxtaposed with the further report that "several officials" said that FM 3-24 will serve "as a primary building block for the new service-wide effort." (7)

It remains to be seen what a doctrine-development architecture so constructed will produce. While Soldiers and Marines would justifiably rely on the outstanding work already found in FM 3-24 in crafting their inputs, that is a rather different proposition from obliging a "pan-service" team to consider it, from the beginning, a "building block." It might have been more creative and equitable to have started with the proverbial clean sheet of paper. As it is, there is an imperative for Airmen (and Sailors) to insist that their views be included on a fully equal basis with those of the other Services.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Airmindedness

Of course, Airmen bring distinct weaponry to the COIN fight but equally--or more--important is the Airman's unique way of thinking. General Henry ("Hap") Arnold termed the Airman's "particular expertise and distinct point of view . . . airmindedness." (8) According to Air Force doctrine, an Airman's "perspective is necessarily different; it reflects the range, speed, and capabilities of aerospace forces, as well as the threats and survival imperatives unique to Airmen." (9) This article contends that an Airman's approach to military problems, including COIN, may differ markedly from that of a Soldier, (10) and that such differences provide the opportunity to capitalize on fresh perspectives.

Insisting on including the Airman's perspective in developing joint doctrine is not pandering to abstract notions of jointness; it is a hard-nosed assessment of what makes Americans winners. The United States is the world's greatest military power because it is built on the free enterprise system, the most successful economic theory in history. Underlying that system is the concept of competition, which drives efficiency and effectiveness, and its application is just as valid in the military realm as in any other.

Competitive analysis of contrasting component approaches will serve the COIN fight immeasurably. Authentic jointness is not meant to remove competition and advocacy in defense issues, but in practice it sometimes seems to have that result. Too often, superficially genteel bureaucratic consensus is misinterpreted as "successful" jointness when in truth it erodes the essence of the competitive spirit that makes America great.

Complementing competition is the concept of cooperation. That involves taking the fruits of competition fairly evaluated and blending them into a warfighting design in a way that productively exploits America's total COIN potential.