Developing joint counterinsurgency doctrine: an airman's perspective

Joint Force Quarterly, April, 2008 by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

Given the expected resentment of the presence of foreign troops, even attempting to use American troops in a close-with-the-population role is not only problematic but also counterproductive in many 21st-century COIN scenarios. In Iraq, for example, despite the widely accepted COIN principle that success requires years of effort, a recent poll showed that 71 percent of Iraqis want U.S. forces to leave within a year. (22) Consequently, inadequate delineation between COIN forces generally and American forces specifically is one of FM 3-24's most serious conceptual flaws.

It may be then that the substitution of technology for manpower is a must for 21st-century COIN operations. Soldiers seem predisposed, however, as the Fehrenbach passage intimates, to be uncomfortable with any technology that might diminish or even displace the large ground force formations so vital to their tradition-driven self-conceptualization. This kind of adherence to tradition is in stark contrast to airmindedness.

An Airman's Way of thinking

FM 3-24 is an exquisite illustration of the differing paths Airmen and Soldiers can take in addressing warfighting matters. Considered more broadly, the contrasting philosophical perspectives underlie the fact that since airpower is "inherently a strategic force," (23) Airmen tend to reason in strategic terms. Soldiers, intellectually disposed to favor "close combat," tend to think tactically.

These are certainly not exclusive focuses of either component; many Soldiers are extraordinary strategic theorists and many Airmen have enormous tactical expertise. Rather, they are merely cultural propensities of the respective Services that are helpful in analyzing FM 3-24's manpower-intensive approach.

The Strategic Inclination. The strategic inclination of Airmen as applied to COIN requires some explanation. FM 3-24 does make a few references to strategic matters but gives them relatively short shrift. (24) There is no across-the-board recognition of the need for anchoring all aspects of modern COIN operations in strategic considerations. Effective doctrine for American COIN forces today must always account for U.S. strategic political goals. With respect to Iraq, this means a "unified democratic Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror." (25)

Thus, FM 3-24's statement that "long term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule" is not quite right. If the government that emerges in Iraq is intolerantly majoritarian, supportive of terrorism, or otherwise hostile to U.S. interests, in real terms the COIN effort there fails.

Strategic thinking also means understanding "politics" in the Clausewitzean sense, that is, the relationship of the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the government, and the military. When COIN operations become disconnected from political goals and realities, even technical, military success can become strategic defeat.