Sourcing perception warriors

Joint Force Quarterly, April, 2008 by C. Glenn Ayers, James R. Orbock

In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks.

--David Kilcullen (1)

In a counterinsurgency fight, shaping the perception of host nation populations is essential to stripping an insurgency of its core means of support. There are numerous avenues available to shape perceptions, but each involves actions to reinforce communications. The premier units capable of shaping perceptions are civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) forces. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) has extensively deployed CA and PSYOP forces. Additionally, within DOD, organizational changes have intensified the stress on these Reserve Component forces. Because of these operational requirements and organizational changes, the Department of Defense must readdress how it is to source these perception warriors in order to finish the long fight.

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Keeping order

In November 2005, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed DOD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," (2) which states that "Stability Operations are a core U.S. military mission." In other words, the Services are to "be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so." Central to this fight is the directive to the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to "develop organizational and operational concepts for the military-civilian teams . . . including their composition, manning, and sourcing," as well as to "support Combatant Commander stability operations training and ensure forces assigned to USJFCOM are trained for stability operations."

The resident stability operations unit within USJFCOM under U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army conventional unit force provider, is the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). It is composed of four CA commands and two PSYOP groups. Major General Herbert Altshuler, former commander of USACAPOC, described its dual mission as:

the bridge between the military commander on the ground and the civilian population in his area of operations. This includes the population, its leadership, elected, appointed or assumed, and the institutions of government and culture of that population. Psychological Operations is an information-based capability. The job is to give the commander on the ground a means by which to communicate with selected foreign audiences in his area of operations to specifically influence their attitudes and behavior. (3)

These two unit types are critical in establishing the conditions for democratic rule of law, creating and shaping popular perception, countering rumors and misinformation, and acting as the frontline ambassadors of good will.

USACAPOC is a unique stability operations unit created from the Reserve force. To support conventional contingency operations, Soldiers must mobilize, train, and then deploy. Under current conditions, mobilization requires 30 days or more. Additionally, with limited numbers of Soldiers assigned to units, personnel are cross-leveled or brought from the Individual Ready Reserve to fill unit vacancies. (4) This cobbling together of units during the mobilization process sends minimally experienced units into a combat zone where complex and innovative solutions are required for success. Although these troops are great citizen-Soldiers, the minimal training and cohesion-building provided by the current deployment process produce less than optimal results. (5)

Additionally, to respond to short-notice crisis situations such as the tsunami disaster of 2004 or after the invasion of Panama during Operation Just Cause in 1990, the conventional force units must rely on the CA and PSYOP units assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The only Active Component forces are in the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and the 4th Psychological Operations Group. Both of these units are tasked to support special operations forces and do not possess excess capacity to support conventional force requirements.

An operational Reserve

A near-term solution to the USJFCOM need for a resident CA and PSYOP capability is to revise current mobilization policies. By activating one Reserve CA brigade and one Reserve PSYOP battalion for 2-year mobilization periods, the units can be based at military installations in the United States for the first year while they increase proficiency through training, become available for short-notice contingency requirements, and then, in the second year, deploy to support ongoing worldwide commitments. The change in mobilization strategy would allow this Reserve unit to become an operational reserve instead of continuing the same strategic reserve policies created after World War II.

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There is opposition to this plan. Some argue that Reservist income decreases with activation, there is undue hardship on families, there is insufficient time between mobilizations, there are not enough Soldiers to fill the ranks, and finally, the burden on employers is too great. Although these concerns are valid, all of these issues would be diminished with a 2-year mobilization rotation instead of the current policy outlined by David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, which requires Soldiers to mobilize for a total of 1 year at a time. (6) In order to activate Reserve Soldiers for a 2-year period, DOD needs to modify current mobilization policies to maximize authorizations under existing congressional legislation.