Executive summary

Joint Force Quarterly, April, 2008 by D.H. Gurney

Rather than pitting one variant of air power against the other ... Enduring Freedom convincingly demonstrated that such 20th-century interservice rivalries have no place in the 21st-century U.S. warfighting establishment. The operation was remarkable for its degree of seamless interoperability between the U.S. Air Force and the Navy-Marine Corps team's sea-based aviation.... In short, aircraft carriers and [land-based] bombers should not be viewed as competitors for resources, but as partners able to leverage unique synergies on the modern battlefield.

--Vice Admiral John J. Mazach (1) Commander, Naval Air Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet

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In its first decade, the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) required students to develop and present personal theories of airpower. After over 300 attempts by its carefully screened student body, the faculty discontinued the effort. The school's Dr. Hal Winton asserted that "there simply does not exist any body of codified, systematic thought that can purport to be called a comprehensive theory of air power." More than one airpower theorist has suggested that a comprehensive theory of airpower is no more useful than a theory of "north"; it has no meaning independent of the other points of the compass, which include land, maritime, and space power. Certainly, any sound theory of airpower should be able to stand up to the same demands as a theory of war writ large; it should be able to define its essence, and that definition should be flexible enough to encompass all the variables related to it. What then is the central proposition of airpower? Undeniably, air, space, and cyberspace are the most efficient lines of communication today. Does dominance of these domains confer maximum influence at an acceptable cost while minimizing risk? The articles in this issue's Forum may lead readers to precisely this conclusion.

In the final analysis, air, space, and even cyberspace power are simply means of exerting national will, and success or failure depends upon how well their application helps to achieve the political objectives sought. Many military analysts and media pundits make the mistake of presuming that a particular type of conflict (conventional, counterinsurgency, cyber, and so forth) is the blueprint for the near future and overemphasize the need to procure and train for a narrow threat or point on the spectrum of conflict. A beneficial outcome of the competition for ideas and resources among the military Services--which all employ airpower--is that the United States develops, upgrades, and fields a wide variety of assets and capabilities, ensuring experimentation, innovation, and operational flexibility while reducing strategic vulnerability. No one knows what the next war will be like, and debates over airpower command, control, and procurement strategies are best resolved in hindsight. Nevertheless, the long-term success of airpower depends upon foresight, and for this reason, our Forum begins with the views of a leader who commands the most powerful air, space, and cyberspace organization on Earth.

In "America's Air Force: The Nation's Guardian," General T. Michael Moseley speaks to the strategy that he has implemented for the Air Force and his assessment of the challenges that will face America tomorrow. His top priorities are winning the war on terror, developing and caring for Airmen, recapitalizing the fleet, and preparing for an uncertain future. His approach to this future is the integrated domination of three core competency domains, at least one of which (the cyber domain) is seriously challenged by potential adversaries. The highlight of General Moseley's article is his tour of the future strategic environment, including the character of 21st-century warfare and his assertion that airpower is no longer the sum, but rather the product, of air, space, and cyberspace superiority. His plan for preserving and enhancing these strategic domains to achieve prompt, persistent, and decisive effects is essential reading for the joint Service professional.

Technological innovation produces the qualitative advantages that allow U.S. airpower to overmatch superior adversary numbers while minimizing the exposure of military personnel to casualty and capture. The most recent example of this central feature of airpower is now being exhibited in the assault support mission performed for decades by helicopters. The first combat deployment of the MV-22 Osprey in Operation Iraqi Freedom is the point of departure for the second Forum article, which focuses on a revolutionary aircraft that has entered the airpower arsenal against long odds. Test pilot and former Osprey squadron commander Glenn Walters outlines the struggle that Marine Corps and special operations community proponents of tiltrotor technology waged against those with a different vision of airpower priorities and requirements. Colonel Walters cites a continuous reference to the principles of war as a means of mitigating the risk of an obsolete debut following the long lead time from conception to deployment of major weapons systems. He makes the case that the MV-22 has exceeded expectations in the first iteration of an aircraft that is undoubtedly destined to produce numerous variants and commercial spinoffs into the future.