Executive summary

Joint Force Quarterly, April, 2008 by D.H. Gurney

The third Forum offering begins with the premise that the joint community has been unable to provide adequate unmanned aircraft system (UAS) coverage to Army forces engaged in tactical operations. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command system manager for UAS argues that when ground units are in contact with the enemy, continuous sensor coverage is not a convenience; it is an imperative. Colonel Jeffrey Kappenman asserts that Army UAS are organic assets and should not be subject to the allocation decisions of central controllers from other Services. In his words, a "strategic concept of centralized control, in which UAS allocation is perceived to have scheduled predictability, does not operationally support [tactical] ground commanders." He goes on to claim that the teaming of manned and unmanned platforms is becoming the standard in Army operations at the division level and below, leading to habitual relationships and more efficient mission planning and execution. He concludes that the joint UAS that meet requirements at corps echelon and above do not alleviate the deficiency in real-time dedicated combat information needed by ground commanders at lower levels. JFQ readers should compare Colonel Kappenman's views with those of General Deptula's in the eighth Forum feature.

In the longest essay that JFQ has ever published, Dr. Mark Clodfelter argues that the past 80 years of American thought about airpower reveal an enduring faith in bombing as a just, rational instrument of military force that makes wars quicker, cheaper, and less painful for all sides than a reliance on surface combat. This conviction, he claims, is the central premise of progressive airpower. Originally developed by visionary airmen such as Billy Mitchell, the belief stems from America's Progressive Era and has been embraced by wartime Presidents. Although it has complemented the messianic tendencies of American foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson, it has frequently undercut Washington's political objectives and helped to achieve the antithesis of the desired results. It has done so for two reasons: (1) it neglects the impact of "friction"--the combination of uncertainty, chance, danger, and exertion that makes actual conflict very different from "war on paper"; and (2) it is ill suited to unconventional and stagnant conventional types of limited war. Friction-induced collateral damage has often undermined war aims, especially in unconventional conflicts to win "hearts and minds"--which Dr. Clodfelter claims are the most likely types of wars that the United States will face in the years ahead. Accordingly, he argues that American leaders should jettison airpower's progressive notions and the rhetoric that accompanies them.

The fifth Forum contribution addresses the space domain from where General Moseley left off. General C. Robert Kehler traces the importance of space systems from victory in Operation Desert Storm, through the establishment of the Space Warfare Center and the training contributions of the 328th Weapons Squadron at the Nellis Air Force Base Weapons School, to today's Joint Space Operations Center. Speaking to General Moseley's point about the myriad products of space superiority, General Kehler identifies terrestrial developments such as low-yield precision munitions, combat search and rescue, and Blue Force Tracking devices. In an overview of space power's future, he asserts that the Air Force knows for the most part what capabilities it will have in the year 2033 and emphasizes the need for recapitalization and modernization to keep pace with warfighting requirements. Technology is blurring the boundaries between warfighting domains, perhaps most notably in the realm of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. Foreseeable threats demand progress in the integration of new capabilities across all military power domains.