Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: the critical role of special operations forces

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2008 by Thomas R. Searle

During a September 2007 visit to Anbar Province in western Iraq, President George W. Bush stated, "Anbar is a huge province. It was once written off as lost. It is now one of the safest places in Iraq." The reason for this stunning turnabout was that Anbaris "who once fought side by side with al Qaeda against coalition troops [are] now fighting side by side with coalition troops against al Qaeda." (1) The program that convinced the Anbaris to support the coalition and the Iraqi national government was called tribal engagement, one of the most successful U.S. programs implemented in Iraq. It has been so beneficial that it was extended to other provinces, and through the Concerned Local Citizens program, the same approach has spread to areas where tribal loyalties were weaker than in Anbar.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

This article highlights the initial role of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) in tribal engagement in Anbar Province and how both Army and Marine Corps forces adopted the engagement strategy and greatly expanded the security environment, altering the political landscape in Anbar and other Iraqi provinces. Conventional U.S. forces have been critical to the success of tribal engagement in Anbar. Indeed, from the start of the initiative, SOF worked in close coordination with the conventional forces that were the "battlespace owners." Various non-Department of Defense agencies made major contributions to tribal engagement at critical moments. The government of Iraq played a vital role, but most important, the heroes of tribal engagement have been the Iraqi people. In the face of horrifying reprisals, Sunni tribesmen have joined their erstwhile enemies, the U.S. and coalition military, and stood up to the al Qaeda terrorists. Without the courage and determination of the tribesmen in Anbar Province, tribal engagement would not have succeeded.

Initial Planning

Tribes in Iraq are ancient social organizations that have survived because they have constantly evolved. Economic activity has also changed the tribe, and these changes impacted both the power dynamics within each tribe and intertribal relations. During Saddam's reign, the tribes along the Euphrates River in Anbar Province had a strong tribal structure. Unable to subvert these structures, Saddam's government and the Ba'ath party coexisted uneasily with them.

In spring 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam's regime, U.S. SOF made contact with some tribes in western Iraq, but the collapse of conventional resistance led to the redeployment of the bulk of SOF. The remaining forces were placed under a new headquarters, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force--Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF--AP), on May 1, 2003. (2) As 2003 progressed, however, the ineffective conventional resistance gave way to a much more dangerous insurgency and an incipient terrorist resistance to the U.S. occupation. To meet this threat, additional SOF were alerted for redeployment to increase their presence across Iraq, including in Anbar Province. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), slated to arrive in Anbar in January 2004, began planning during the second half of 2003.

The SOF planners considered various indirect methods to defeat the insurgent groups, led by former regime members and foreign fighters who were starting to coalesce under the leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi and would later become known as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The planners decided to engage Anbar tribes to gain access to the "human and geographic terrain" in the province and thereby deny that terrain to the insurgents and terrorists. In the words of one participant, this was a way to "dry up the lake so you can kill the piranha." SOF planners selected the tribes that Saddam had oppressed and marginalized as the best candidates for initial contact.

Saddam had oppressed these tribes and forced them out of most forms of legitimate commerce. They had to rely on smuggling and the black market to survive. After Saddam's fall, their smuggling networks brought foreign jihadists and weapons into Iraq, but the smuggling tribes were looking to make a profit, not to support religious fanaticism. With the right incentives, the SOF planners reasoned, these tribes would turn on the terrorists. The tribes and SOF teams, with coalition support, could then force the enemy out of the tribal areas. Planners also wanted each tribe to provide a small force to participate in coalition operations and, with training from the special operations teams, develop the capability to conduct unilateral counterterrorist and counterinsurgent operations. (3)

The planners believed they could start small, and when the first few tribes began demonstrating improvements in security and prosperity, other tribes would want to join. This "model city" approach took time, but once it got rolling, the tribes realized they could improve their security and economic prospects by supporting the coalition. Any tribal leader who tolerated insurgent activity was brought into line by denying his tribe access to the economic benefits of supporting the coalition.