Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: the critical role of special operations forces

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2008 by Thomas R. Searle

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Starting from Scratch

In 2004, the mainstream Anbar tribes were sitting on the fence or leaning toward the insurgents and terrorists. The SOF teams modified their model city approach with some of the tribes. When they arrived in Anbar, SOF teams approached lower-level tribal sub-sheikhs and found out what they needed in terms of civil affairs (CA) projects. The SOF elements then "under"-promised and "over"-performed on those projects, building trust and respect. Over time, these projects increased the prestige and authority of the sub-sheikhs, thereby undermining the sheikhs above them. The top tribal leaders then realized that it was in their and their tribes' best interests to ask SOF troops for CA projects. This indirect approach took more time than approaching a top sheikh directly, but was more effective because the senior sheikh asked for a meeting with the team rather than the other way around.

Engaging the tribes was not easy in early 2004. The SOF troops ruled out trying to win "hearts and minds" by simply doing nice things for the tribes because the tribes did what was in their long-term best interest. Influencing the tribes meant earning trust and respect through commitment and continuity. At that point, the United States had not yet pursued the strategy of continuity and commitment in Anbar and, accordingly, had not earned much trust or respect there. The SOF troops largely started from scratch. (4)

On the ground in Anbar, SOF teams soon learned that by managing the CA projects, they were in effect becoming sheikhs, as Iraqi civilians came to them with their problems. Not wanting to assume responsibility for the tribal social and political structures, SOF teams shifted their approach and publicly gave the resources to local sheikhs. In doing so, the teams lost some control over how the resources were used and accepted that some sheikhs would enrich themselves. Because of their cultural awareness, SOF personnel understood the way Iraqi society worked and made use of the tribal customs to advance tribal engagement. Empowering the sheikhs had the substantial benefit of reinforcing both the sheikh's authority and indigenous Iraqi social structures that could be maintained indefinitely. While the sheikh was responsible for running the programs, the SOF teams focused on building indigenous security forces, targeting terrorists and insurgents, and expanding the tribal engagement networks.

The special operators had to be skillful purveyors of "carrots and sticks" to win over the sheikhs. The rewards and punishments ranged from a commitment to reinforce the sheikhs' forces in the event of an al Qaeda attack, to denying CA support to an uncooperative sheikh, to public gestures of respect and indications of American support. The SOF teams arrived with strong cultural understanding but had to develop the detailed local knowledge necessary to determine whom to influence and how. The teams needed the authority to provide the precise carrot or stick the situation required.