Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: the critical role of special operations forces

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2008 by Thomas R. Searle

U.S. conventional and Iraqi forces also fanned out to small outposts in populated areas, where they maintained a presence and backed up the local police. The combination of U.S. military prowess and Iraqi familiarity and ties to the province made them a better long-term bet for the tribes than AQI. Accordingly, support for AQI faded in the province. (11)

Another major contribution of the conventional forces was engaging tribal leaders outside Iraq. Many large tribes extended into neighboring countries, and when violence rose, some top tribal leaders left Iraq. The SOF elements in Iraq lacked the rank to get the attention of these leaders, but general and flag officers from Multi-National Force-West, MNC-I, and Multi-National Forces-Iraq played critical roles by meeting with key tribal leaders outside Iraq. (12)

Tribal engagement was also challenging from a public affairs and information operations standpoint. To enlist tribes, the tribal engagement program needed to be well publicized. However, any publicity immediately made the tribes that joined, and the sheikhs who led them, high priority targets for AQI. Once Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha decided to support the United States and the Iraqi government, he was tireless in promoting his new cause. He convinced many other sheikhs to side with them as well and gained much publicity for the program. AQI eventually assassinated him, but not before he had substantially strengthened the tribal engagement program.

As tribal engagement gathered momentum and conventional forces in Anbar Province took the lead, SOF shifted to a "connect-the-dots" role of working the seams and pulling together the many local tribal engagement activities across Anbar and in neighboring provinces. To do this, the SOF presence in western Iraq was increased by adding a Naval Special Warfare Task Group of SEALs. The CJSOTF--AP commander drew the boundaries between his elements so that they overlapped the boundaries between conventional forces in order to meet the challenge of closing the seams between conventional forces. This put SOF teams in a position to identify and address enemy efforts to find and exploit the boundaries between U.S. conventional forces.

MNC-I and Multi-National Division-Baghdad established "reconciliation cells" in the summer of 2007 to manage tribal engagement efforts and recruit tribal members into local provisional police and the Iraqi security forces. (13) The 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, worked with a 2,300-man Sunni unit, dubbed the Volunteers, to patrol a sector of Anbar between Baghdad and Fallujah. According to the division commander, violence fell sharply in the area between April and July 2007, and there were no attacks on U.S. forces there for more than 2 months. (14) The Marine 6th RCT trained tribal volunteers in eastern Anbar Province in mid-2007. Their sheikh asked tribal members to fight AQI, so the Marines agreed to train 50 tribesmen to form a provincial security force in their village. (15) The success of tribal engagement in Anbar led other units to adopt similar approaches. In Babil Province, elements of the 25th Infantry Division began approaching tribes in the summer of 2007 to enlist volunteers for local security forces in exchange for funds and job programs in their areas. (16)