Letters

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2009 by Robert H. Bryant, Michael R. Lehnert, Gian P. Gentile, John A. Nagl

This approach is nothing less than fanciful, and it is reinforced by the American Army because it is the only way we have come to view the world and how to use military and national power in it. While this might make the American Army happy because we can isolate ourselves in our tactical and operational worlds (just as we did in the 1980s), it is not the basis for good strategy and military advice for policy.

It is time to break out of this straitjacket for the good of the Army and, more importantly, for the good of the Nation that we are sworn to protect and serve.

--Colonel Gian P. Gentile, USA

[V]ictory in the Long War requires the strengthening of literally dozens of governments afflicted by insurgents who are radicalized by hatred and inspired by fear. The soldiers who win these wars require not just an ability to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies--and not all of those soldiers will wear uniforms, or work for the Department of the Army. The most important warriors of the current century may work for the US Information Agency rather than the Department of Defense.

--from John A. Nagl's review of Brian McAllister Linn's The Echo of Battle, in The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, April 2008

To the Editor--In the 20th century, the primary problem of international relations was dealing with states that were too strong to fit comfortably within their own borders--first Germany, then Germany and Japan, and finally the Soviet Union. In this century, the primary problem of international relations may well be states that are too weak to control what happens within their borders--Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico. These states are not fully sovereign; they cannot completely control what happens on their territory. In these ungoverned lands grow non-state actors such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, and narcotraffickers that present a clear and present danger to the people of the United States and the security of the world.

This change in the nature of the threat that we face demands new thinking about the security of America. The tank divisions that I was honored to serve in for 20 years were the right organizations to deter the Soviet Union across the Fulda Gap and to destroy Saddam Hussein's army--not just once, but twice. Tank divisions remain necessary to deter conventional aggression against our friends, but they are no longer sufficient. The challenges of the 21st century demand new national security organizations, designed not only to defeat our enemies but also to strengthen our friends.

President Barack Obama's recent speeches on American strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the changes required in our force structure to deal with today's threats. In Iraq, Army Brigade Combat Teams will be replaced next summer with Advisory and Assistance Brigades, optimized to help the Iraqi army more capably deal with the internal and external threats that a recovering Iraq still faces. In Afghanistan, a brigade of the famed 82d Airborne Division will be reconfigured not to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban, but to advise and assist the Afghan National Army and Police to do so.