Afghanistan: the path to victory

Joint Force Quarterly, July, 2009 by Joseph J. Collins

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The focal point of the war on terror has shifted from Baghdad to Kabul, from Mesopotamia to the Hindu Kush. It is in U.S. national interest to pursue a balanced counterinsurgency and state-building policy in Afghanistan. This policy--neither cheap nor quick--should be focused on the defeat of hardcore Taliban and its associated movements, which include al Qaeda, and the simultaneous creation of a capable and effective state in Afghanistan. There are no quick-fix or silver-bullet solutions to the problem. To accomplish this policy, we will have to pick up the pace and creativity of our efforts. We--the United States and its coalition partners--must do this with all deliberate speed and in close coordination with our efforts to support Pakistan.

The urgency of strategic reform stems from one key fact of life: we are in serious (but not grave) trouble in Afghanistan. Violence is up, and despite a doubling of U.S. forces and the recreation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), security incidents have increased more than tenfold since 2004. Last year, a provincial capital was attacked, and rumors of Taliban shadow governments in many provinces abound. President Hamid Karzai's approval rating has slipped--by the most favorable estimates to around 50 percent. Inefficiency and corruption are rampant. Urged on by reports of collateral damage and civilian casualties, Afghans who rate U.S. performance as "good" or better have slipped to only a third of the population. (1) Only their barbarity, poor performance, and limited repertoire have kept the Taliban from greater successes. While they have steadfastly believed that time is on their side, they still can only win if the coalition quits.

It is no wonder that the Obama administration and U.S. Central Command have conducted strategic reassessments. Many people, however, are still asking how this conflict will end, and others wonder whether it is worth the effort. In the eighth year of this conflict, other experts remember that General George Marshall warned during World War II that "a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War." (2) Another group points to our massive national debt and wonders whether we can afford to throw good money after bad.

Pundits and professors have searched diligently for silver-bullet solutions. Some suggest that we should just focus on what is important for us, counterterrorism, and not worry about state-building. In the world of academic theory, this might be possible--but in reality, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, reconstruction, stabilization, and state-building in Afghanistan are all strands in the same rope. In the end, if we do not help to create a stable, decent Afghan state, our counterterrorism efforts will be required there perpetually. Why should Afghanistan--30 years at war and one of the five poorest nations on Earth--accept the risks and costs of being our ally in this war and expect nothing in return? If we cannot offer the Afghans a better life, what is the difference between us and the Taliban?

Other experts suggest that, since Afghanistan has never had a functioning central government, we should stop trying to build one and work all of our priorities through local and tribal officials, bypassing the sclerotic government in Kabul. Henry Kissinger has even noted that "attempts to establish centralized Afghan control have rarely succeeded and then not for long." (3) This pessimistic conclusion clouds Afghan history. For generations, there was a central government in Kabul that, along with provincial, local, and tribal entities, created law and order and did the business of the country. Marin Strmecki, a longstanding expert in regional affairs, told the Senate Armed Services Committee:

until the late 1970s, Afghanistan [was] a relatively stable developing country for most of the twentieth century. It was a poor country, to be sure, but one with a state that carried out basic governmental functions and that enabled gradual political and economic progress. (4)

In a similar vein, some believe that we should work more closely with border tribes, forming militia or auxiliary units akin to the Sons of Iraq who figured prominently in the surge in that country. Indeed, there are some safe ways of using tribal formations, but without tight control and central direction, we could end up encouraging warlordism or violent local rivalries. In any of these schemes, balancing central government and local prerogatives should be an important priority for Afghan government officials.

Reconciliation may well be another false hope. While encouraging the defection of Taliban members is fine (and ongoing), the notion that the Taliban could form a political party within Afghanistan's democratic framework is as far-fetched as thinking that there could be an autonomous "Talibanistan" inside the current Afghan state. Not only is the Taliban leadership not eager to negotiate while they are doing well, but there are also other obstacles to reconciliation: